Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 75 | Issue 1

2009

Stare Decisis in Cognitive Error
Goutam U. Jois

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Goutam U. Jois, Stare Decisis in Cognitive Error, 75 Brook. L. Rev. (2009).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol75/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Article 2

Stare Decisis Is Cognitive Error
Goutam U. Jois †
[A]fter [courts] have proceeded a while they get their own set of
precedents, and precedents save “the intolerable labor of thought,”
and they fall into grooves, just as judges do. When they get into
grooves, then God save you to get them out of the grooves.
—Learned Hand1

I.

INTRODUCTION

For hundreds of years, the practice of stare decisis—a
court’s adherence to prior decisions in similar cases—has
guided the common law. However, recent behavioral evidence
suggests that stare decisis, far from enacting society’s “true
preferences” with regard to law and policy, may reflect, and
exacerbate, our cognitive biases.
The data show that humans are subconsciously primed
(among other things) to prefer the status quo, to overvalue
existing defaults, to follow others’ decisions, and to stick to the
well-worn path. We have strong motives to justify existing
legal, political, and social systems; to come up with simple
explanations for observed phenomena; and to construct
coherent narratives for the world around us. Taken together,
these and other characteristics suggest that we value precedent
not because it is desirable but merely because it exists. Three
case studies—analyzing federal district court cases, U.S.
Supreme Court cases, and development of American policy on
torture—suggest that the theory of stare decisis as a heuristic
†
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has substantial explanatory power. In its strongest form, this
hypothesis challenges the foundation of common law systems.
* * *
A hundred and fifty years ago, Tocqueville wrote that
the greatest outrage to an Anglo-American lawyer was
accusing him of having an original thought. If one
characterized the lawyer as being an innovator, “he will be
prepared to go to absurd lengths rather than to admit himself
guilty of so great a crime.”2 The common law system and its
reliance on precedent, he wrote, forced lawyers to argue as
though all of the rationale for their clients’ position was
compelled by pre-existing case law. Tocqueville was “surprised
to hear [the common lawyer] quoting the opinions of others so
often and saying so little about his own.”3 Conversely, a lawyer
in the civil law system would “deal with no matter, however
trivial, without . . . carry[ing] the argument right back to the
constituent principles of the laws.”4
Change comes slowly to the common lawyer. He “values
laws not because they are good but because they are old,” and if
the law must be changed in some respect, “he has recourse to
the most incredible subtleties in order to persuade himself that
in adding something to the work of his fathers he has only
developed their thought and completed their work.”5 Innovation
is anathema to him.
Recent social psychological evidence suggests that
Tocqueville was on to something—about all of us, not just those
of us trained in the common law. Across a wide range of
contexts, the data provide compelling evidence of humans’
tendencies to prefer existing social systems and status quo
endowments and a simultaneous subconscious “priming” to
justify those existing defaults. If this is true, then the AngloAmerican legal system, with its emphasis on stare decisis and
adherence to precedent, exacerbates this human shortcoming.
Thence arises the title of this Article. Relying on
precedent might be a good idea, or it might not. But it is clear
that, rather than reflecting our “true preferences,” the theory
and practice of stare decisis are at least partially rooted in our
cognitive biases. There are two ways this could be the case.
2

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (George Lawrence
trans., J.P. Mayer ed. 1969).
3
Id. at 267.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 268.
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First, the practice of stare decisis may have evolved merely as a
reflection of cognitive bias, and nothing more. This is the
strongest, and most provocative, version of my argument.
Second, the current practice of stare decisis may be yielding
judicial decisions that are at least partially the product of
heuristic judgments, resulting in socially-suboptimal results.
I use the term “precedent” very broadly here. Legal
doctrine may expand or limit the role of precedent in various
contexts.6 However, as Frederick Schauer points out in his
seminal article, Precedent:
Appeals to precedent do not reside exclusively in courts of law.
Forms of argument that may be concentrated in the legal system are
rarely isolated there, and the argument from precedent is a prime
example of the nonexclusivity of what used to be called “legal
reasoning.” Think of the child who insists that he should not have to
wear short pants to school because his older brother was allowed to
wear long pants when he was seven. Or think of the bureaucrat who
responds to the supplicant for special consideration by saying that
“we’ve never done it that way before.” In countless instances, out of
law as well as in, the fact that something was done before provides,
by itself, a reason for doing it that way again.
Reliance on precedent is part of life in general.7

Even though most of my examples are from court
decisions, I use this broad conception of precedent in this
Article—the form of reasoning that we humans use on a
regular basis and one that affects almost every mode of legal
analysis. This does not mean that reliance on precedent will
always produce bad results. It does mean that we should be
skeptical of legal rules that become entrenched merely by
virtue of their longevity. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote
in The Path of the Law:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.8

6

See, e.g., infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 (1987)
[hereinafter Schauer, Precedent]. Of course, I do not want to overplay this point.
Schauer himself acknowledges that reasoning from precedent is certainly concentrated,
and more important, in law than elsewhere. Id.
8
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
469 (1897).
7
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A century earlier, Thomas Jefferson espoused a similar
view. Requiring one generation to live under a Constitution set
out by its predecessor, he wrote, was like “requir[ing] a man to
still wear the coat which fitted him when a boy.”9 To right this
perceived wrong, he believed that the Constitution should
contain a provision “for its revision at stated periods.”10
Jefferson suggested that a mechanism for “doing this every
nineteen or twenty years, should be provided by the
Constitution; so that it may be handed on, with periodical
repairs, from generation to generation.”11
In this sense, Jefferson’s ideas were anti-Burkean.
Edmund Burke, the father of modern conservatism, implored men
to trade on the “general bank and capital of nations, and of ages,”
and to distrust their own “private stock of reason.”12 Jefferson
disagreed: “Each generation is as independent as the one
preceding, as that was of all which had gone before. It has then,
like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it
believes most promotive of its own happiness . . . .”13
Yet the common law system does not allow each court,
or even each generation, to “choose for itself” that which “it
believes most promotive of its own happiness,” making it more
Burkean than Jeffersonian. In the American system, if an issue
under consideration has been directly decided by the Supreme
Court, lower courts are bound to reach the same result, “unless
and until [the Supreme] Court reinterpret[s] the binding
precedent.”14 A lower court cannot disregard the rule merely
because it thinks an alternative would be “most promotive of
[the current generation’s] happiness.” It cannot even disregard
the legal rule if “the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since.”15 As the Supreme Court has explained, “If
a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a
9

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (June 12, 1816), in 15
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 32, 42 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh
eds., 1904).
10
Id.
11
Id. at 41. Jefferson did not arrive at the time frame by accident. The
mortality tables of his day suggested that the majority of adults living in a given
generation would be dead within nineteen years. Id. This gives rise to the shorthand
formulation, that Jefferson believed that the Constitution should be rewritten every
generation.
12
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 183 (W.
Alison Phillips & Catherine Beatrice Phillips eds., 1912) (1790).
13
Jefferson, supra note 9, at 42.
14
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 238 (1997).
15
Holmes, supra note 8, at 469.
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case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.”16 As a result, “[j]udges are . . .
obliged to answer the same question in the same way as others
have answered it earlier, even if they would prefer to answer it
differently.”17
And so Jefferson and Holmes have not been heeded.
Despite their protestations, we are old men wearing boys’ coats,
abiding rules laid down in the time of Henry IV.18
However, there is more to this story. The provocative
title notwithstanding, the thesis of this Article is not (only) that
stare decisis is cognitive error. I want to draw further
conclusions about the implications of cognitive bias for the
common law system. Over the years, evidence from social
psychology has made increasingly clear that humans’ actions
do not conform to the “rational actor model,” as had been
supposed, implicitly or explicitly, by economic and legal theory
for decades. Evidence in the behavioral literature suggests that
we humans tend to overvalue existing, historical, and
traditional arrangements. Our cognitive biases are correlated,
and they all suggest an undue reliance on the past. This ought
to be of concern to lawyers, because the cornerstone of our legal
system is reliance on prior decisions.
There are three possibilities: First, our common law
system, and stare decisis, might be nothing more than
reflections of a constellation of correlated cognitive biases. If
this is true, then we are substantially worse off for relying on
precedent, in all cases and at all levels, than we would be in a
system where each case was approached with a blank slate.
Second, in the weaker version of the argument, reliance on
16

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (emphasis

added).
17

Frederick Schauer, Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) is Not Totally
(or Even Substantially) About Analogy, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 454, 454-60 (2008)
[hereinafter Schauer, Analogy].
18
This may actually understate the problem somewhat. King Henry IV ruled
from 1589 to 1610. See JOHN P. MCKAY ET AL., 2 A HISTORY OF WORLD SOCIETIES, 466
(8th ed. 2008). Meanwhile, the Rule in Shelley’s Case, (1581) 1 Co. Rep. 93b (K.B.),
actually predates the time of Henry IV. And there are several United States
jurisdictions that still adhere to the rule, at least in part. See JESSE DUKEMINIER &
JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 298-99 (5th ed. 2002) (describing the rule); id. at 300
(noting that the rule still applies in Arkansas and to pre-abolition wills in jurisdictions
that have abolished the rule non-retroactively, including Ohio, Illinois, and North
Carolina).
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precedent might generally be desirable. However, in close
cases, judges should not rely on precedent, absent special
justification, because they might be relying on precedent as a
heuristic—a cognitive shortcut—and not because it yields the
desirable result. Third and last, in the weakest version of the
story, the fact that humans (and courts) are susceptible to
these biases, while perhaps noteworthy, should not lead to any
doctrinal change. In this weakest version, the argument in this
Article would likely have little role to play in the context of
“vertical stare decisis,” but some role in the context of
“horizontal stare decisis.”19
This is not the first article to explore the implications of
behavioral phenomena on the law. Nonetheless, it fills a gap in
the existing literature in at least three ways. First, it builds on
the extensive literature that has explained, in general terms,
how insights from social psychology can and should change our
understanding of legal theory.20 Second, it continues the
tradition of authors like Cass Sunstein (on information
cascades),21 Lawrence Lessig (on social norms),22 and Adrian

19

Vertical stare decisis refers to the obligation of a lower court to follow the
binding precedent set by a higher court in its jurisdiction. Horizontal stare decisis
refers to the presumption that a court will decide current matters in line with the
earlier decisions of the same court. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo,
An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of
Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1750-51 (2008) (describing the two kinds of
stare decisis).
20
Jon Hanson and his co-authors have been most prolific in this regard. The
tandem articles The Situation and The Situational Character were groundbreaking
articles that displaced the rational actor model with the “situational” model, informed
by insights from social psychology. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The
Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) [hereinafter Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situation]; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A
Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character]. Hanson’s more recent three-part project
explains how situational insights explain recent trends in the development of legal
doctrine and legal theory. See generally Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great
Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior are Shaping Legal
Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311 (2008); Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism:
Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499 (2008); Adam
Benforado & Jon Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal Theorists to
Situationist Insights, 57 EMORY L.J. 1087 (2008).
21
See generally Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and
Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006).
22
See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
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Vermeule (on group decision-making),23 who explore the
implications of specific psychological findings on the law. Third,
the Article expands on works of authors who have focused on
discrete psychological phenomena and written about them in
the context of specific legal doctrines: the stickiness of default
rules in contract law;24 the endowment effect with regard to
injunctions;25 reimagining tort law26 or corporate law27 in light of
social psychology; and so on.
The literature has thus far focused on broad questions
of legal theory (by authors like Hanson) or on specific
phenomena and doctrines (by Sunstein, Lessig, Vermeule, and
others). This Article, focusing on the process of legal reasoning,
is situated at the niche between broader questions of legal
theory and more specific doctrinal questions.
This Article has three main parts. In Part II, I survey
arguments for stare decisis. These arguments sound one (or
more) of three themes: stare decisis (1) is more likely to lead to
correct results; (2) fosters stability, predictability, and
efficiency; (3) enhances the legitimacy of the courts.
In Part III, I catalogue various psychological
phenomena that undercut arguments for stare decisis: we
humans have a tendency to prefer the status quo (status quo
bias); to overvalue existing entitlements (endowment effect); to
make decisions based on others’ choices (information cascades);
and more. In addition, we are motivated to seek reasons for our
choices that support existing legal, political, and social systems
(system justification theory); to create coherent patterns from
past occurrences (motive to cohere); and to develop simple
explanations for observed phenomena (motive to simplify).
Taken together, these phenomena cast significant doubt on
arguments for stare decisis.
In Part IV, the heart of the Article, I describe three case
studies that support my hypothesis. First, I make a series of
23

See generally Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the
Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2007) [hereinafter Vermeule, Common
Law Constitutionalism].
24
Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006).
25
Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227 (2003).
26
Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1345 (2008).
27
Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimizing
Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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predictions regarding when a court’s decision is more likely to
reflect heuristic judgments rather than cogent reasoning. I
examine court cases analyzing whether there is an implied
private right of action under section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, and conclude that the evolution of this legal rule over the
past several years strongly suggests that the decisions reflect
cognitive bias. In the second case study, I summarize Anuj
Desai’s recent articles regarding the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on certain First and Fourth Amendment
doctrines to argue that this line of cases reflects the Supreme
Court’s reliance on precedent as a heuristic. Third, I find
evidence of cognitive bias in the recent (and still-unfolding)
series of developments with regard to the debate over the
definition of torture and the treatment of detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The issue of torture, in this context,
arose against the background of the Global War on Terror. The
war has led the American legal system into uncharted
territory. In this situation, if anywhere, one might expect
courts and policymakers to approach the questions presented
with a clean slate. I will attempt to show that their
unwillingness (or inability) to do so suggests a reliance on
precedent not for its informational value, but because of
decision-makers’ attempt to seek out patterns and coherent
doctrinal stories.
With these lessons in mind, Part V lays out three
possible versions of my argument, which I alluded to above:
that the practice of stare decisis is always unreliable; that stare
decisis should be abandoned in close cases only; or that the
Article’s insights should result in no doctrinal changes. I leave
it to the reader to decide which explication of the theory is most
persuasive.
II.

ARGUMENTS FOR STARE DECISIS
We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private
stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is
small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves
of the general bank and capital of nations, and of ages.
—Edmund Burke28

In general, this Article takes aim at the practice of stare
decisis and argues that, at least in certain situations and within
28

BURKE, supra note 12, at 183.
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certain constraints, stare decisis may be unreliable. It is not my
intention here to describe all of the arguments for stare decisis.
Indeed, the nature and doctrinal scope of stare decisis vary by
context: constitutional cases versus non-constitutional cases;29
“pure” common-law cases, like contracts or torts, versus
statutory cases;30 in specific states, federal courts, or
international courts;31 and so on. These fine distinctions have
practical and theoretical relevance in context. However, in this
Article, I paint with a broad brush. I rely on the more general
conception of stare decisis: “[t]he doctrine of precedent, under
which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the
same points arise again in litigation.”32 Stare decisis may have a
horizontal component (where a court follows its own earlierdecided cases) and a vertical component (where a lower court
follows a higher court’s earlier decided cases).33 I also use the
terms “stare decisis” and “precedent” interchangeably, although
29

See, e.g., Thomas E. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the
Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 703-04 (1999) (“Amidst all
the contradictions and retractions in the modern Court’s doctrine of precedent, one
point has achieved an unusual degree of consensus: that stare decisis has ‘great weight
. . . in the area of statutory construction’ but ‘is at its weakest’ in constitutional cases.”
(quoting Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 235-38 (1997))); cf. Lee J. Strang & Bryce G. Poole, The Historical (In)accuracy of
the Brandeis Dichotomy: An Assessment of the Two-Tiered Standard of Stare Decisis for
Supreme Court Precedents, 86 N.C. L. REV. 969 (2008) (criticizing the dichotomy
described above). Strang and Poole cite opinions by a variety of justices to demonstrate
that this dichotomy has purchase on the Court along the political spectrum. See id. at
971-72 (citing Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice O’Connor, and Justice
Breyer).
30
See, e.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW, at vii
(1988) (noting in the Preface that his book focuses on “that part of the law that is not
based on [authoritative] texts,” and that “the same set of principles” does not apply to
“the interpretation of constitutions, the interpretation of statutes, and the
establishment of common law rules”); see also Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating:
A (Somewhat) New Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 89, 109 (1998) (“[C]ommon
law precedents enjoy a presumption of correctness stronger than that applied to
constitutional cases, but not as constraining as that enjoyed by statutory precedents.”);
Brian C. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare Decisis: Distinguishing Common-Law,
Constitutional, and Statutory Cases, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277, 277-78 (2004).
31
See, e.g., Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Toward De Jure Stare Decisis in
WTO Adjudication, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873, 876 (2001); Thomas G. Field III,
The Role of Stare Decisis in the Federal Circuit, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 203, 204 (1999); Steven
Gardner, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare Decisis in North
Carolina, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1996); David A. Hartquist et al., Toward a Fuller
Appreciation of Nonacquiescence, Collateral Estoppel, and Stare Decisis in the U.S.
Court of International Trade, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 112, 112 (1991); Jeffrey T. Renz,
Stare Decisis in Montana, 65 MONT. L. REV. 41, 42 (2004); Mark Sabel, The Role of
Stare Decisis in Construing the Alabama Constitution of 1901, 53 ALA. L. REV. 273, 274
(2001).
32
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009).
33
See, e.g., Nash & Pardo, supra note 19, at 1750-51.
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there is a slight difference between the two terms.34 I use them
interchangeably because “[w]hat I say here applies to both kinds
of precedent.”35 The argument in this Article may have more or
less relevance in a particular doctrinal context, as the scope and
role of precedent varies, but the basic point is the same.
Nonetheless, regardless of the context, stare decisis is
defended for one or more of three primary reasons. First, stare
decisis is defended because it is more likely to lead to correct
results. This line of argument has its roots in Edmund Burke
and other Burkean scholars, who argue that the reasoning
ability of any given individual is small and that he would do
better to rely on the received wisdom of his forebears. The
Condorcet Jury Theorem is a different, but related, version of
this argument.36 The Theorem argues that under certain
constraints, as the number of decision-makers increases, the
probability of reaching the correct result approaches one.37
Therefore, individual decision-making power is low; answers by
large groups, over time, are more likely to be correct.
Second, stare decisis is defended on legal positivist
grounds. These arguments generally bracket the question of
whether the received rule is correct or not. Instead, they
contend that reliance on established legal doctrines makes the
law more stable over time; more predictable so that parties can
arrange their matters in accordance with the law; and more
efficient and therefore welfare-enhancing. In this Article, I use
the shorthand “stability, predictability, and efficiency” to refer
to these related arguments in support of stare decisis.
Finally, stare decisis is defended on the grounds that it
preserves the legitimacy of the judiciary. In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,38 the plurality reasoned that it was
obligated to uphold the “essential holding” of Roe v. Wade, in

34

See Schauer, Analogy, supra note 17, at 6 n.2 (“Technically, the obligation
of a court to follow previous decisions of the same court is referred to as stare decisis
(‘stand by what has been decided’), and the more encompassing term precedent is used
to refer both to stare decisis and the obligation of a lower court to follow decisions of a
higher one.”).
35
Id.
36
See, e.g., Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at
1485-1501 (discussing “Burke as Condorcet”). But see David L. Shapiro, The Role of
Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929, 943
n.49 (2008) (finding Vermeule’s argument “ultimately unpersua[sive]”).
37
See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 328 (2002).
38
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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part to preserve “institutional integrity.”39 The plurality noted,
among other things, that “the Court’s legitimacy depends on
making legally principled decisions.”40 If courts’ rulings were
subject to the whims of the particular judge, then the public
would lose faith in the judiciary.
A.

Burkean Traditionalism

In its most basic form, stare decisis—“[t]he doctrine of
precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation”41—acts
as a check on radical change. If a court at time t+1 is obligated
to follow the decision of the court at time t, then it is less likely
to be able to propound its own view of the case. Stare decisis
acts as a limit on the ability of a given court to rely on its
“private stock of reason.” In this sense, stare decisis has
Burkean elements to it, undergirded by a sense that prior
decisions are more likely to be correct than newer decisions.
In Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke
explained his disagreement with the French Revolution:
though the movement’s values were ostensibly desirable, it was
essentially a quick attempt to change the political structure of
the French government. Rather than sudden change, Burke
favored the wisdom found in tradition and noted the
importance of connecting the current political system to the
past:
By this unprincipled facility of changing the state as often, and as
much, and in as many ways as there are floating fancies or fashions,
the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be
broken. No one generation could link with the other. Men would
become little better than the flies of a summer.”42

Burke explains that by abandoning traditions, people
actually limit their own capabilities since they falsely believe
they possess enough knowledge to create new political
structures. Instead of working with the structures of the past
to create a more stable government, they reduce themselves to
“flies of a summer” with fleeting notions of how government
ought to function.43
39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 845-46.
Id. at 866.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 32, at 1537.
BURKE, supra note 12, at 91-92.
Id.
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Although Burke was not opposed to generating new
ideas in general, he was opposed to their rapid implementation
since he believed such an act was an insult to past generations
of thinkers, as well as an abandonment of their legacy. The
present generation, according to Burke, were simply
“temporary-possessors” of their laws and constitutional
heritage.44 Therefore, “they should not think it amongst their
right to cut off the entail, or commit waste on the inheritance,
by destroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their
society.”45 If they did, they would not only “leave . . . a ruin” to
those who came after them but also “teach[] these successors as
little to respect the[ new institutions] as they had themselves
respected the institutions of their forefathers.”46 The past ought
to be bellowed not merely because it was probably correct, but
also because failure to do so demonstrated a lack of respect for
one’s forebears.
Russell Kirk reflects on Burke’s desire to retain the
wisdom of our predecessors, explaining that for Burke, “In the
government of the nation, the people participated through their
representatives—not delegates, but representatives, elected
from the ancient corporate bodies of the nation, rather than
from an amorphous mass of subjects.”47 In other words, “ancient
corporate bodies” still play a role in the present-day political
system since their contributions make up essential elements of
our current system of law.48 A rapid abandonment of such
contributions would result in unforeseen consequences.
This kind of Burkean thinking underlies (implicitly if
not explicitly) the common law system, which relies on case law
and precedent to help determine the outcome of current cases:
“A constitutional order with a strong dose of common-law
judicial definition and a proclaimed fidelity to precedent pushes
in a Burkean direction.”49 This theory of constitutional
interpretation, implicit in the common law, “f[ound] its most
famous expression in Burke’s great work.”50 Rather than
44
45
46
47

Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELLIOT 18 (7th

ed. 2001).
48

Id.
Samuel Issacharoff, Meriwether Lewis, the Air Force, and the Surge: The
Problem of Constitutional Settlement, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 649, 668 (2008).
50
David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 969, 973 (2008) (citation omitted).
49
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determine how best to promote its own happiness, a given
generation must be humble and respect the limits of
rationality.51 Although “judgments about morality, fairness, and
justice” are permissible, they are only permissible “within the
narrow confines left open by tradition.”52
Strauss, in turn, cites Calabresi, who writes that “in our
constitutional culture there is actually a well-established
Burkean practice and tradition of venerating the text and first
principles of the Constitution and of appealing to it to trump
both contrary case law and contrary practices and traditions.”53
Similarly—and still in the Burkean vein—defenders of
stare decisis argue that overruling past decisions, even if they
currently seem incorrect in the eyes of the judges, may prove a
worse option, given that overturning precedent requires a sort
of epistemological arrogance on the part of current judges.54
Nelson explains that “this was particularly true when a long
line of decisions had all reached the same conclusion. If a series
of judges had all deemed something to be a ‘correct’ statement
of the unwritten law, a later judge who doubted the statement
ought to be modest enough to question his own position.”55
Thus, both as a form of respect for tradition that Burke
stressed, as well as for the actual information contained in
precedent, prior decisions ought to be followed.

51

Id. Some contemporary authors, such as David Brooks, have written about
the limits of human rationality. See, e.g., David Brooks, The Social Animal, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2008, at A23. But Brooks and others in the Burkean vein take this in a
different direction than I do. Brooks argues that, because humans’ rationality is
limited, we should be skeptical of programs that seek to impose broad-based change:
the agenda of those who seek reform, he writes, are based on purportedly optimal,
rational models; because humans are not perfectly rational, the reform is likely to fall
short of its stated goals. See, e.g., David Brooks, The Big Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2009, at A25. Thus, Brooks relies on social psychology to argue in favor of Burkean
traditionalism. See id. (acknowledging that “Burke ha[s] a point” and explaining that
broad-scale agendas of change “set off my Burkean alarm bells”). Conversely, (one piece
of) my argument is that Burkeanism itself could be seen as reflection of the status quo
bias, endowment effect, and so forth. Brooks cites deviations from the rational actor
model as a reason to be wary of large-scale efforts to address social problems. My
argument is the opposite: we should be willing to entertain large-scale change (such as
reimagining the role of precedent in our legal system)—but we should do so in a way
that acknowledges how people really act, not an idealized vision of how they might act.
52
Strauss, supra note 50, at 973.
53
Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text,
Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 637 (2006).
54
See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedent, 87
VA. L. REV. 1, 34 (2001).
55
Id.
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Stability, Predictability, Efficiency

The Burkean position, that precedent should be followed
because it was likely to be correct, undergirded the view,
dominant in the nineteenth century, that the common law is
the repository of the collected rationality of the AngloAmerican people.56 Edward Rubin characterizes this as
“Langdell’s mythology,” but one that has persisted for quite
some time.57 However, as Rubin points out, for over a century, it
had been clear that the common law was not a “natural”
institution that reflected the right answers to all legal
questions.58 Instead, it arose out of an effort by King Henry II
“to suppress dissension by displacing local law in England with
a system of royal justice that would be common to the entire
realm.”59 Under this conception, reliance on precedent is
desirable for instrumental reasons: it makes the law uniform,
predictable, and stable.
In a civil law system, courts are generally not bound by
prior decisions; they are always free to change course.60 In the
common law, however, stare decisis binds future courts to
reach the same conclusion as prior courts, furthering the
predictability of law.61 Maltz gives a sharp example of the role
of stare decisis in fostering predictability:
As an illustration of the point, consider the action of the Michigan
Supreme Court in Parker v. Port Huron Hospital. In Parker the court
abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity, which had prevailed
in the state since the decision in Downes v. Harper Hospital.
Challenging the decision to overrule Downes, one might well
56

Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong With Langdell’s Method, and What to Do
About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 623-26 (2007).
57
Id. at 623-26.
58
Id. at 616-31.
59
Id. at 627.
60
1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW § 123 (La. State L. Inst.
trans., 12th ed. 1939).
61
Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 368-69 (1988). I
should note that my argument has some application in civil law systems as well. The
doctrine of jurisprudence constante, under which a particular rule of law is to be given
weight if many courts have reached that same decision, is the civil law analogue to the
common law’s stare decisis. One distinction between the doctrines is that jurisprudence
constante requires a large number of courts to have reached the same conclusion, while
a single case can have precedential effect in a common law system. See, e.g., WillisKnighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm’n., 903 So.2d 1071,
1088 n.17 (La. 2005). The concerns I highlight below, such as cascades, status quo bias,
and so on, apply even in the civil law context. The problem may be mitigated because
jurisprudence constante has persuasive, rather than binding, effect, see, e.g., Doerr v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000), but it would be present nonetheless.
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conclude that charitable institutions planned their activities and
budgets with the assumption that they would be immune from tort
liability. Based on the same assumptions, these institutions may
have failed to obtain liability insurance. Thus, the argument would
conclude, Parker was wrongly decided because it defeated the
justified expectations of the institutions relying on the Downes rule.62

By this argument, stare decisis enables individuals to
predict consequences and act accordingly. This also prompts
stability in the law, since judges cannot make arbitrary
decisions. This could be particularly true in property law: “if
titles had passed in reliance on [prior rules] or if people had
otherwise conducted transactions in accordance with them—
the resulting reliance interests could provide a reason to
adhere to decisions even if they were now deemed erroneous.”63
In such cases, maintaining a commitment to past decisions in
order to ensure and protect reliance interests remains an
important feature of the argument in favor of the advantages of
stare decisis, even against critics’ claims that an “important
value is getting the right answer to critical questions of
constitutional meaning.”64 The Supreme Court has endorsed
such a view, commenting that “[c]onsiderations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and
contract rights, where reliance interests are involved.”65 The
instrumentalist view finds perhaps its most famous expression
in the words of Justice Brandeis: “Stare decisis is usually the
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right.”66 Stare decisis prevents the disruption that would occur
if judges were constantly seeking the “correct” rule.
Relying on precedent also helps ensure efficiency in the
common law system. Cardozo explains that by relying on
precedent, current judges expedite the decision-making
process. Through stare decisis, “[a] stock of judicial conceptions
and formulas is developed, and we take them, so to speak,

62

Id. (citations omitted). Maltz goes on to note, however, that the new rule
was made prospective in application, so charities that had relied on the old rule would
not be affected. Id. at 369.
63
Nelson, supra note 54, at 20.
64
Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some
Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 329 (2005).
65
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
66
Burnet v. Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
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ready-made.”67 Thus, judges can draw on this bank, avoid
having to rethink each legal question, and consider more cases
than would be otherwise possible.68 “[T]he labor of judges would
be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision
could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s
own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses
laid by others who had gone before him.”69 This argument has
found purchase even at the Supreme Court.70
Some critics argue that relying on precedent without
recognizing that past decisions might have been incorrect is
misguided. However, supporters of stare decisis point out that
the benefits of maintaining past decisions far outweigh the
consequences. In fact, while Nelson recognizes there might be
instances where past precedent is undoubtedly incorrect,
falling beyond even the wide range of possible outcomes
associated with each case, he suggests that these instances
might be the exception and in general, upholding stare decisis
proves more valuable than not.71
There is another component to the argument that stare
decisis promotes efficiency. Some scholars argue, essentially
following Posner, that the common law system is and has been
geared toward economic efficiency. In their classic book on tort
law, Landes and Posner write that “the common law of torts is
best explained as if the judges who created the law . . . were
trying to promote efficient resource allocation.”72 Posner does
not cabin this theory to tort law; he believes that the common
law is best explained as a system of wealth-maximizing rules.73
“The gist of that contention is that in a common law system
there are incentives for repeat players to litigate inefficient
rules but not to litigate efficient rules; [however judges decide a
case,] this mechanism will inevitably lead to an increase in the
stock of efficient legal rules.”74 This convergence-on-efficiency
67

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 47-48 (1921).
Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern
of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 626 (2001).
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CARDOZO, supra note 67, at 149.
70
Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Services v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450
U.S. 147, 154 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]hese concerns are not . . .
insubstantial”) (citing CARDOZO, supra note 67, at 149).
71
Id.
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WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 1 (1987).
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RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 26 (6th ed. 2003).
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Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law
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theory has its roots in Lord Mansfield’s proclamation that the
common law “works itself pure,”75 the hypothesis that bad rules
will get weeded out over time.
Thus, whether the focus is on the time that judges save
or the maximization of social wealth, scholars for centuries
have argued that reliance on precedent furthers efficiency.76
C.

Judicial Legitimacy

Courts follow precedent because it is correct or in the
interest of stability. But they also do so for a third reason:
because it furthers judicial legitimacy: “One of the most widely
shared values in the American political system is that
principles governing society should be ‘rules of law and not
merely the opinions of a small group of men who temporarily
occupy high office.’ The doctrine of stare decisis reinforces this
value . . . .”77 Maltz points out that stare decisis (1) simply
makes judicial decisions look better, because the instant
decision is based on pre-existing law and not impulsive
preferences; and (2) implies a judicial role of “law-finding” and
not “law-making,” a value that does in fact limit judicial
discretion.78
Along these lines, Nelson notes, “According to many
commentators, frequent overruling jeopardizes public
acceptance of the courts’ decisions.”79 The joint opinion of
Justices Souter, Kennedy, and O’Connor in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey states, “[t]he Court’s power lies . . . in its
legitimacy.”80 Nelson explains that for these Justices it was
important to adhere to the core holding of Roe v. Wade so that
the country would not lose “confidence in the Judiciary.”81 In
this respect, stare decisis helps maintain the legitimacy of the
court. In the absence of stare decisis, the public might lose faith
75

Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch.).
Most behavioral critiques of the common law tend to focus on this
efficiency argument. For example, Hanson and Hart have argued persuasively that the
famous “BPL” formula developed by Judge Learned Hand, often cited as an example of
the efficiency of the common law of negligence, does not in fact yield the efficient
outcome in that case. See Jon D. Hanson and Melissa Hart, Law and Economics, in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 311, 311-31 (Dennis Patterson
ed., 1996).
77
Maltz, supra note 61, at 371 (citation omitted).
78
Id. at 371-72.
79
Nelson, supra note 54, at 68.
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505 U.S. 833, 983 (1992).
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Nelson, supra note 54, at 68 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 865, 867).
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in the courts and therefore doubt the strength of the rule of
law.
D.

Conclusion

In short, stare decisis is defended for any or all of the
preceding reasons. In the next Part, I catalogue common
cognitive and psychological phenomena that undercut these
arguments for stare decisis.
III.

COGNITIVE BIASES THAT UNDERCUT ARGUMENTS FOR
STARE DECISIS
If precedent represents a weak or impoverished learning device, then
a common law system of adjudication seems unlikely to produce
reliable results.82

As described in the previous Part, there are many
reasons a system of stare decisis is desirable. These goals
might be worth pursuing and might even be correct on their
own terms. Nevertheless, the behavioral literature of recent
years gives us serious reason to question the epistemic basis of
those arguments. In turn, we should be skeptical of using stare
decisis as a decisional guidepost. In this Part, I survey that
behavioral literature.
Three preliminary points are in order: First, the
following discussion is not meant to be exhaustive. There may
be other behavioral phenomena that support my thesis; I only
discuss those that are most relevant to my argument and
relatively well known. Second, I do not discuss the phenomena
in much depth. I summarize the key findings of the literature
to the extent necessary to develop the doctrinal application of
the literature. The interested reader can find citations to the
underlying papers, studies, and experiments in the footnotes.
Finally, much of the discussion tracks that set forth by Hanson
and Yosifon in The Situational Character, which provides some
82

Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: A Critical Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
87, 91 (1999). Talley ultimately concludes that precedent cannot be fully explained by
cascades. Id. at 92. But crucially, he reaches this conclusion because his analysis
focuses exclusively on cascades and not other cognitive biases. See id. Unlike Talley’s
paper, my analysis surveys a variety of cognitive and behavioral phenomena. The
position I advance is not that precedent represents an information cascade, but that a
broad range of phenomena (including cascades) suggest that precedent may not be
advancing the goals we think it advances for the reasons we think it is advancing
them. I respond more fully to Talley near the end of this Article. See infra notes 376382 and accompanying text.
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more detail on the phenomena I discuss as well as a broader
survey of such phenomena.83
At the end of this Part, I make a bold claim: the
behavioral evidence gives us very strong reason to believe that
the common law system (1) reflects cognitive biases; (2)
magnifies cognitive biases; or (3) does both. I use “common law”
loosely here. The critique applies to typical common law
subjects, like contracts or torts, but also to statutory and even
constitutional interpretation. It applies to federal courts and
state courts, trial courts and appellate courts. It applies to the
Supreme Court of the United States and it applies to district
courts. It applies to instances where courts rely on prior court
decisions as well as instances where they rely on earlier
statues or other sources. It even applies to legal policymaking
in general, that is, not just to court decisions. In short, the
critique applies very broadly.
In a slightly different context, Adrian Vermeule writes,
“The key point is not that judges are likely to get things wrong;
it is that when they do get things wrong, they are likely to err
in systematic rather than random ways.”84 Work from several
academic disciplines shows that we humans possess a series of
correlated biases that make us more likely to favor existing
conditions, overestimate the costs of change, and
underestimate the benefits of new social arrangements. If these
phenomena motivate us, consciously or not, to overvalue what
we already possess, then a legal system designed to rely almost
exclusively on past decisions probably places too much
emphasis on the past. The presence of correlated biases should
be of great concern to legal scholars and policymakers.
A.

Choice Biases

Hanson and Yosifon describe choice biases as those
which “most clearly influence (and challenge economists’
typical assumptions regarding) people’s choices.”85 Recall that,
according to the dominant view, stare decisis is defended
because it leads to correct adjudication, stability, efficiency,
and legitimacy. If lawyers’ and judges’ choices are shaped by
these heuristics and biases, then decisions that we think foster
these desirable goals may instead be reflecting the fact that we
83
84
85

Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 20.
Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1501.
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 20, at 39.
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are “cognitive misers”86 trying to avoid “the intolerable labor of
thought.”87
1. Cascades
Stare decisis typically requires subsequent courts to
follow the decisions of prior courts. The subsequent court, in its
written decision, typically explains why it was correct that it
follow the prior decision. But what if the later court’s reasoning
was subconsciously skewed? What if the later court had reason
to know the prior decision was probably inapplicable—but
followed it anyway? As described below, the phenomenon
known as “cascades” suggests that might be exactly what
happens: subsequent decision-makers will follow a decision
that was made at some earlier time, merely because it was
popular—not because doing so is “correct” or “preferable” in
any objective sense.
Scholars generally distinguish between three different
types of cascades: information cascades, reputational cascades,
and availability cascades.88 As Kuran and Sunstein write, an
informational cascade “occurs when people with incomplete
personal information on a particular matter base their own
beliefs on the apparent beliefs of others.”89 A reputational
cascade is a similar case, in which “people take to speaking and
acting as if they share, or at least do not reject, what they view
as the dominant belief.”90 The combination of the two—when
informational and reputational cascades “exhibit interactions
and even feed on one another”—is known as an availability
cascade.91
The phenomenon of cascades—particularly information
cascades—has relevance in law.
A strictly informational cascade occurs when people start attaching
credibility to a proposition P (e.g., a certain abandoned waste dump
is dangerous) merely because other people seem to accept P. To
recast an earlier illustration, suppose that Ames signals that he
believes P. Barr, who would otherwise have major reservations,
86

Id. at 23.
HAND, supra note 1, at 241.
88
See, e.g., Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirschleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning
from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J.
ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 685.
89
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 685-86.
90
Id. at 686-87.
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Id. at 687.
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believes P because Ames appears to do so. Cotton, who would have
dismissed the proposition as silly, begins taking it seriously upon
discovering that not just Ames but both he and Barr are believers.
Noticing that Ames, Barr, and Cotton all seem alarmed, Douglas
then accepts P without further thought. When Entin learns that all
of his friends believe P, he joins the pack of believers on the grounds
that their shared understanding cannot be wrong.92

The problem, of course, is that everyone believed P merely
because Ames did, even if, in some cases, they had information
that would have led them to conclude otherwise!
In a recent study, Salganik and his co-authors describe
the results of a music downloads study.93 Participants in the
study had the opportunity to download one of a range of songs.
However, the authors introduced an element of social influence:
participants could see what songs were being downloaded by
others in a sort of “most popular songs” list. (The list, of course,
could be manipulated.) In general, the best songs never did
very badly, and the worst songs did not do particularly well.
However, “almost any other result is possible.”94 When songs
were on the list of popular songs, participants downloaded
those songs. In other words, the mere signal of a song’s
popularity increased the frequency of downloads—as
participants received a “relatively weak” information signal.95
The increased downloads created a sort of feedback loop, and
those songs moved up on the list of popular songs. In making
these seemingly independent decisions, participants were
susceptible to significant social influence and demonstrated an
information cascade.
It is important to note that information cascades are not
necessarily irrational. As Vermeule writes, an information
cascade occurs when “individuals rationally allow[ed] the
presumed information of others to swamp their private
judgments.”96 If you have better information than I do, then it is
92

Id. at 721. The authors explain that reputational and availability cascades
involve some element of social pressure. I do not dwell on those here, not because they
are not relevant but, for simplicity’s sake, I assume that judges face no social or
reputational pressures. Of course, this assumption may not be correct—but to the
extent that the assumption does not hold, my argument is even stronger.
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Matthew J. Salganik et al., Experimental Study of Inequality and
Unpredictability in the Artificial Cultural Market, SCI. MAG., Feb. 10, 2006, at 854.
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Id. at 855.
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Id. at 854-55.
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Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 28, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
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quite rational for me to follow your decisions. The problem
arises when I assume you have better information and you
don’t. As I describe in the next Part, certain phenomena may
alert us to the presence of a cascade.
2. Status Quo Bias
Information cascades are an external influence on
individuals’ decision-making; the external cues of popular
songs influence private choices about what to download. Status
quo bias, on the other hand, is an internal influence on choice.
It operates regardless of what is happening around us.
Kahneman and his co-authors discuss status quo bias in
their article on “anomalies”—psychological phenomena that are
difficult to fit into the rational actor model, because
“implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the
paradigm.”97 Status quo bias is such an anomaly. In one
experiment, individuals were asked to choose between several
alternatives. In the “neutral” setting, they were simply asked
to make a choice. In the “status quo” setting, one was the
current arrangement, and they were asked to stick with the
status quo option or choose an alternative. “Many different
scenarios were investigated, all using the same basic
experimental design. . . . The[] results implied that an
alternative became significantly more popular when it was
designated as the status quo. Also, the advantage of the status
quo increases with the number of alternatives.”98 In another
study, consumers were asked to choose among utility providers.
Some respondents currently had very reliable utility service.
Approximately sixty percent of those respondents expressed a
“preference” for high-reliability service. Other respondents
currently had unreliable utility service. Approximately sixty
percent of those respondents expressed a preference for lowreliability service. Among both groups, only about five percent
were willing to switch to the other option.99 In both cases,
individuals “demonstrated a pronounced status quo bias.”100 The
remarkable point is that even those with unreliable service

97

Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 193 (1991).
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said they preferred it! The devil we know truly is more
comforting—even when we know it is suboptimal.
Kay, Jimenez, and Jost explain our preference for the
actual and anticipated status quo through the twin examples of
sour grapes and sweet lemons. They write that humans have a
large capacity for rationalization, even in suboptimal
situations. “It has been argued that people possess a
‘psychological immune system’ that allows them to adjust to
suboptimal outcomes by enhancing the subjective value of the
status quo while devaluing alternatives to it.”101 The sour
grapes/sweet lemons analogy helps explain how humans
rationalize situations by bringing “preferences into line with
expectations.”102 In the famous fable, the grapes are initially
attractive. However, once the grapes become unattainable, they
“become” sour. Of course, the character of the grapes has not
changed at all; we merely rationalize the fact that we know we
cannot get the grapes by making ourselves believe the grapes
are sour. More interesting, however, is the “sweet lemons”
phenomenon. In this situation, an initially less favored
outcome (the lemon) becomes more favorable as the likelihood
of such an outcome becomes greater—the lemons become
sweeter if they are the more attainable.103 (This begins to cross
over into system justification theory, which I discuss in Part
III.B.1, infra.)
Rationalization of the anticipated status quo
demonstrates humans’ strong tendency to adapt to, and
“prefer” the status quo. We justify events that are likely to
happen, even those that initially seem unfavorable, just as we
justify the already existing status quo. In other words, if we
already have lemons, we are likely to justify our possession of
lemons by believing they are sweet rather than try to get
grapes which are more unattainable, and therefore we believe
them to be sour. In Kay et al.’s study, survey respondents
(prior to the 2000 election) were told that George W. Bush’s
election was very likely based on certain polls. In light of this
information, Republicans and Democrats increased their
favorability rating of Governor Bush.104 The same result, in the
101
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opposite direction, occurred when respondents were told that
polls showed Vice President Gore likely to win.105 In short, we
“accommodate, internalize, and even rationalize key features”
of the status quo.106 When given a menu of options, we tend to
choose the status quo, and when a given arrangement is about
to become the status quo, we are remarkably adept at coming
up with reasons why it is sweet and all others are sour.
3. Endowment Effect
One reason we may prefer the status quo is because we
over-value it relative to other options. As Russell Korobkin
explains, “The much studied ‘endowment effect’ stands for the
princip[le] that people tend to value goods more when they own
them than when they do not.”107 Jones and Brosnan define the
endowment effect as “a psychological phenomenon that appears
to underlie some seemingly irrational pricing of property and to
thereby impede efficient exchange.”108 The endowment effect
challenges the Coase Theorem, because the party holding a
certain entitlement has an above-market willingness to accept
price. When the other party is only willing to pay the market
price, the entitlement will not change hands.109 This has legal
implications because the Coase Theorem suggests that, among
other things, (when transaction costs are low) parties will
bargain around injunctions and other legal entitlements
regardless of the initial allocation of those entitlements.
However, given the endowment effect, the efficient outcome is
not likely to occur.110
In Knetsch’s oft-cited study, one group of students was
offered a choice between a coffee mug and a chocolate bar as
compensation for participating in the experiment. The second
105
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group was given a coffee mug initially, and then given the
opportunity to trade it for a chocolate bar at the end of the
experiment. The third group was given a chocolate bar at the
beginning of the experiment, and then at the end was given the
opportunity to trade it for a coffee mug. The results of the
experiment showed that under the choice condition given to the
first group, fifty-six percent of the students selected the mug.
However, each of the other two groups exhibited a strong
preference for what they already had: ninety percent of those
given the mug refused to trade it for a chocolate bar while
ninety percent of those given the chocolate bar refused to trade
it for the mug. Each group “preferred” its initial endowment,
even though, given a choice, preferences were about fifty-fifty.111
It is worth noting that, for purposes of my analysis, it is
not especially important why the endowment effect, or any of
these phenomena, actually occur. Jones and Brosnan attempt
to explore this question, and posit that the so-called “irrational”
psychological phenomena may include some number “that once
(and indeed long) were substantively rational, in the
traditional economic sense,”112 but no longer are. However, this
is not relevant to the first-level analysis. If humans exhibit
certain tendencies that make them over-reliant on precedent,
loosely defined, that finding has important implications for the
law. Why the endowment effect occurs is relevant to the secondlevel analysis, the “So what?” question. If we are concerned
about these biases and want to use procedural or other
methods to debias lawyers and judges, then it is helpful to
know how and why these phenomena occur. However, their
origins are not necessarily relevant to my overall argument
that these phenomena undercut arguments for stare decisis.
4. Framing Effect
Earlier, I noted that the desirability of a policy option
increases if it is described as the status quo. This is a version of
the framing effect. Gonzalez et al. explain that
the “framing effect” is observed when a decision maker’s risk
tolerance (as implied by their choices) is dependent upon how a set of
options is described. Specifically, people’s choices when faced with
consequentially identical decision problems framed positively (in
111
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terms of gains) versus negatively (in terms of losses) are often
contradictory.113

As a result, individuals prefer sure gains to risky gains and
prefer risky losses to sure losses.114
Kahneman and Tversky, who identified and named the
phenomenon, describe the framing effect as “both pervasive
and robust.”115 Moreover, it is “as common among sophisticated
respondents as among naive ones.”116 This point is particularly
relevant to the law. One easy way to dismiss the discussion of
these phenomena is to posit that they manifest themselves in
trivial settings like controlled studies involving chocolate bars.
However, on closer inspection, that claim does not hold water.
Kahneman and Tversky’s studies show that the framing effect
affects sophisticated respondents. Moreover, as discussed
above, people demonstrate a strong status quo bias even when
they believe their responses will affect policy.117 The endowment
effect is a barrier to post-judgment bargaining in real-life
lawsuits, when individuals presumably have important
interests at stake.118 Respondents report support for an
undesirable status quo even when presented with the
important—and divisive—issue of a presidential election. In
sum, the facile response, “Sure, but that wouldn’t happen in
real life when judges are faced with serious issues,” is not
compelling. Indeed, as I show in Part IV.A.2, heuristic
judgments are reflected even at the United States Supreme
Court.
5. Path Dependence
Path dependence is another example of how individuals
demonstrate
an
undue
deference
toward
existing
arrangements. Pierson explains that our current perception of
political and economic outcomes is informed by the timing in
which the initial political or economic decision was made.
113
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Therefore, a seemingly minor decision gains significance as it is
propagated over time and more people become accustomed to
the consequences of that decision.119 Liebowitz and Margolis
provide an example of path dependency using the concept of
videotaping formats, Beta and VHS.120 They explain that an
initial decision by consumers to use VHS, without previous
knowledge as to which format provides better quality, might
have much greater implications in the future if, based on this
arbitrary decision, everyone continues to buy VHS for
compatibility purposes.
Liebowitz and Margolis define three different degrees of
resulting path dependency. First degree path dependency
explains that these initial decisions are made at random and
thus efficiency models cannot predict which format will be
chosen. With first degree path dependency, there is no
inefficient outcome regardless of which option the public
chooses, assuming that Beta and VHS provide similar quality.
If over time it becomes apparent that Beta is the better option,
then second degree path dependency occurs. In this scenario,
choosing arbitrarily was rational given the initial conditions of
limited knowledge as to which option was better. However, in
retrospect (once we know that Beta is superior), the public
realizes that the wrong decision was made initially. Third
degree path dependency takes this one step further, assuming
conditions where Beta was known to be superior from the start.
If a small initial majority of consumers were to choose VHS,
customers who prefer Beta—but have not yet made a
decision—might choose VHS, unaware that others might also
prefer Beta. If the present-day benefits of switching from VHS
to Beta outweigh the costs, yet consumers remain hesitant to
switch because they are unwilling to leave their current
system, third degree path dependency occurs again.121
Pierson explains that path dependence is significant
because individuals become accustomed to current conditions,
regardless of why and when they occurred. Thus, costs of
switching increase over time, and the originally-arbitrary
decision becomes lasting and substantial.122 Pierson relates this
119
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concept to increasing returns to scale, stating, “in an increasing
returns process, the probability of further steps along the same
path increases with each move down the path . . . . To put it a
different way, the costs of exit—of switching to some previously
plausible alternative—rise.”123 He then explains that “formal,
change-resistant institutions” are especially susceptible to this
process, since the cost and ambiguity associated with exit
remain high. Pierson concludes that understanding path
dependency provides “an important caution against a too easy
conclusion of the inevitability, ‘naturalness,’ or functionality of
observed outcomes,”124 cautioning us to consider that current
institutions might not have been derived from an
understanding of efficient conditions, but instead created based
on conditions that are not only ancient but also initially
arbitrary. As Mark Roe points out, path dependence means
that “survival does not imply present-day superiority to untried
alternatives.”125
In her article on path dependence and stare decisis,
Oona Hathaway distinguishes between increasing returns path
dependence, evolutionary path dependence, and sequencing
path dependence.126 The first category has its roots in the
economics literature. Once a given decision is made, it is less
costly to continue down that same path than to change to a
different path. In this context, path dependence arises out of
increasing returns.127 Evolutionary path dependence has its
origins in the biological literature, in which the current genetic
makeup of a species is constrained by its past evolutionary
changes.128 Sequencing path dependence refers to the process by
which the order in which choices are made affects the outcomes
of those choices. In other words, if ten people need to make a
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decision seriatim, each person’s individual decision could be
affected by where he chooses in the lineup.129
6. Sticky Defaults
Relatedly, individuals are generally hesitant to deviate
from current conditions because of the ease with which default
rules get entrenched. On the Stickiness of Default Rules, by
Ben-Shahar and Pottow, explores the factors prompting parties
to continue using undesirable (but waivable) default rules in
contract law, even when opting out of a legal default rule did
not impose high costs or ambiguous outcomes on the parties.130
The first reason they explain for this irrational phenomenon is
that “in the presence of a familiar and commonly utilized
background provision . . . a transactor might fear that
proposing an opt-out from the default will dissuade his
potential counterparty from entering into the agreement.”131
The counterparty may view any opt-out from the default as a
“trick,” used to cover up an unknown problem.132 Therefore,
regardless of the practicality and efficiency of opting out of a
default rule, a party might stick with the default rule since it
attracts less suspicion and might hinder forming an agreement.
This becomes especially apparent in areas where “it is
uncommon for other market participants to negotiate a tailored
provision, that is, where the background rules and templates
are well entrenched and commonly employed.”133
Ben-Shahar and Pottow further explain that the default
rules might work in a similar manner to the concepts
underlying the endowment effect. If a legal default is viewed as
an entitlement, and added value is placed on a legal default
because an individual already possesses or understands that
default, then he will be less likely to opt out of the default.
Based on Korobkin’s experiment investigating the endowment
effect, Ben-Shahar and Pottow conclude that the “findings do,
indeed, lend support to the conclusion that human beings are
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cognitively disposed to prefer a default legal rule in contractual
negotiations, irrespective of the content of that legal rule.”134
Also stemming from Korobkin’s experiments on the
endowment effect, Ben-Shahar and Pottow find that
individuals prefer legal default rules because choosing an optout option might leave individuals with a greater feeling of
regret.135 Korobkin finds that individuals prefer options in
which they do not have to take action to change the current
situation. Even if individuals are not happy with a current
situation, the perception that they will be worse off after
changing the situation (whether or not that perception is
correct) provides a powerful disincentive to change, since
individuals might then regret their action.136 In this sense,
regret is worse than accepting the current sub-optimal
situation. Thus, Ben-Shahar and Pottow conclude “the
attractive role of inaction in the service of ‘regret avoidance’ by
decisionmakers”137 provides a powerful motive to stick with
commonly-known default rules.
B.

Attitudes and Motives

The rational actor model typically assumes that
individuals have certain preferences, they think about those
preferences, and then choose a certain course of action by
exercising their will.138 The choice biases discussed above
demonstrate that we do not “think” the way we think we think.
The attitudes and motives discussed here demonstrate that we
do not “prefer” the way we think we prefer. In other words, our
reasoning is, among other things, motivated to justify existing
social arrangements, to create coherent narratives for observed
phenomena, and to simplify ambiguities. I discuss these in
more detail below.
1. System Justification Theory
John Jost and his co-authors have developed the idea of
system justification theory to explain why individuals support
and “prefer” the existing system, even when doing so appears
134
135
136
137
138
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to do more harm than good. Jost, Banaji and Nosek define the
theory of system justification as “the process by which existing
social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of
[one’s] personal and group interest.”139 In several of Jost’s
articles on the subject, he and his co-authors explain how
system justification theory prompts individuals to value the
system they currently have, especially when the system
appears unlikely to change.140 System justification theory goes
further than this, however, in that it motivates people not only
to accept the current system, but to justify it. Jost and
Hunyady explain, “System justification theory holds that
people are motivated to justify and rationalize the way things
are, so that existing social, economic, and political
arrangements tend to be perceived as fair and legitimate.”141 In
other words, people not only accept the status quo—they come
up with reasons why it is right that the world is as it is.
Jost and his colleagues give possible explanations as to
why individuals practice system justification. For example,
individuals may fear broad-based social change, preferring
systems they know and understand.142 “For many people, the
devil they know seems less threatening and more legitimate
than the devil they don’t.”143 In cases where the system seems
unlikely to change, individuals rationalize the system in order
to convince themselves the system is fair, increasing
“satisfaction with one’s situation.”144
While system justification theory may lead individuals
to self-report a relatively high level of satisfaction with the
system, Jost explains that such reasoning actually hampers
systems from evolving in a more fair and inclusive direction.
For example, if individuals rationalize the status quo, they are
unlikely to change it and may continue to justify an often
unfair system without exploring new possibilities.145 Jost also
describes the legal implications of system justification theories.
For example, victims of abuse or discrimination might be
139
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unlikely to bring attention to their cause if doing so would
threaten the status quo. More generally, Jost explains that the
system justification theory “identifies important obstacles to
social change in general, as well as to change in law and legal
scholarship. Law, lawyers, and legal scholars need to take
seriously the research on system justification motives and
processes.”146
In a recent article, Blasi and Jost point out that the
Supreme Court could point to only two instances in which it
directly overturned an earlier precedent.147 They hypothesize
that this could be in part because “cognitive dissonance,
implicit biases, and system justification motives affect judges,
just like the rest of us.”148 A broader version of this point is
precisely the claim I make, and develop, in this Article.
2. Motive to Simplify
The motive to simplify and the motive to cohere provide
another set of motivational factors prompting individuals to fall
subject to a plethora of cognitive biases. Kunda explains that
“we prefer those hypotheses that have greater simplicity, that
is, require fewer additional hypotheses or assumptions to
146
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account for the full range of evidence.”149 Hanson and Yosifon
further note that we prefer simple social theories and
explanations to more complicated versions because our minds
“operate under scarce capacity, cognitively, temporally, and
conceptually.”150 This motive to simplify, however, is often at
odds with other motivations, such as the motive to be accurate,
which requires more complex thought and explanation.151 This
becomes problematic for individuals since “this conflict between
the motive for simplicity and the motive for accuracy may spill
over and cause discord for our motive of self-affirmation.”152
3. Motive to Cohere
The motive to cohere explains why we are not
comfortable with conflicting sets of motives, such as the
combination of the motive to simplify with the motive to be
accurate. “Because we value coherence, the desire to see it in
ourselves dovetails with our motive for self-affirmation.”153
Thagard explains that individuals strive to make sense of
themselves and the outside world, and attempt to do so by
“fitting something puzzling into a coherent pattern of mental
representations that include concepts, beliefs, goals and
actions.”154 He further explains that “coherence can be
understood in terms of maximal satisfaction of multiple
constraints,” working together to form the most coherent story
possible given the information available.155 Hanson and Yosifon
explain that on an individual level, we seek to make our
current situation cohere with our personal desires.156 In order to
make our current situation more desirable, we compensate for
a situation we dislike by physically gaining something (for
example a monetary compensation), or else we alter our beliefs
about that situation.157 Think here of the young associate who
hates his BigLaw job but justifies keeping the job on the basis
of his large paycheck.
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On a group level, we seek coherence between our beliefs
and the group’s beliefs, but this motive often stems from
pluralistic ignorance. For example, in the “Princeton drinking
study,” Prentice and Miller found that college student
respondents mis-estimated their peers’ attitudes toward
alcohol consumption.158 Then, in turn, they overestimated the
gap between their peers’ drinking and their own; they assumed
their peers were drinking more than they actually were.159 This
is problematic when pluralistic ignorance influences behavior,
prompting individuals to alter their perceptions (which might
initially be correct) to fit what they misperceive are the
perceptions of others in order to promote group coherence.
Unfortunately, “[t]he problem of pluralistic ignorance and the
motive for group coherence distorts many social norms and
would seem to have significant implications for policy and
law,”160 as many decisions in these areas are made based on
inaccurate assumptions.
C.

Stare Decisis is Cognitive Error

Stare decisis—reasoning from precedent—requires
adhering to a prior decision because it is the prior decision, not
necessarily because it is correct. Frederick Schauer has
explained that reasoning from precedent is commonplace in all
forms of argument, not just legal argument.161 When a younger
child argues that he should be allowed to do something because
his older sister was allowed to do so when she was the same
age, the child is arguing based on precedent.162 He is essentially
saying, “You should follow the same rule in this case that you
followed in the prior case.”163 The youngster expects the prior
rule to apply in his case, regardless of whether the rule was
correct then or is correct now.
However, taken together, the phenomena outlined above
pose serious challenges to this mode of reasoning. First, the
way we humans make choices strongly suggests that we are
inclined to choose existing arrangements, not because they are
158
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preferable but merely because they exist. Second, our brains
are hard-wired in such a way that even the act of reasoning—
something that is at the heart of every judicial opinion—is
skewed toward viewing the existing set of legal rules as just,
right, and natural.
In general, we (lawyers, judges, and citizens) are likely
to overvalue existing legal entitlements because of the
endowment effect. The Coase Theorem, which predicts that
individuals will bargain around inefficient injunctions, turns
out not to work in practice as it should in theory, in part
because parties overvalue the injunction once it is in place.164
Similarly, path dependence, the stickiness of default rules, and
status quo bias suggest a cognitive predilection in favor of the
way things are and have been. Thus, even judges with a goodfaith interest in being alert to the possibility of inefficient or
otherwise undesirable precedents may fail to see that they are
perpetuating, rather than mitigating, the rules’ effects.
This is illustrated by the phenomenon of information
cascades. Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have made a version
of my argument in their 2006 article, The Law of Other
States.165 There, Posner and Sunstein develop a framework for
analyzing when courts in one jurisdiction ought to treat as
persuasive authority a rule laid down in a similar case in a
foreign jurisdiction.166 They note that the Condorcet Jury
Theorem typically suggests that if many other relevant
decision-makers have reached a particular result, then this
particular decision-maker has reason to believe, with a
relatively high probability, that the outcome is the correct
one.167 This rationale applies to courts’ decisions too; if several
courts reach a particular outcome, we might be more confident
in the correctness of their result. But this conclusion requires
each iterative decision to be independent, a criterion that is
violated when cascades are present.
Earlier, I noted that the information cascade
phenomenon is not irrational—a given judge, presuming that
those who came before him had good information, has a high
164
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level of confidence that they are correct and rationally follows
their lead.168 However, as Vermeule points out, “[a] strategy
that is individually rational for judges at any given time—
following custom or tradition or precedent—is harmful to all if
followed by all, because it drains custom or tradition or
precedent of any epistemic value.”169 At least to the
Condorcetians and Burkeans, following tradition is more likely
to lead to the correct answer. But if individuals are
“withdrawing” from this bank of knowledge, but not
contributing to it, then—by virtue of information cascades—we
are all worse off.
Such is also the case with status quo bias and the
endowment effect. Typically, we assume that judges will
independently evaluate a case and make a decision based on
the merits. If a particular legal rule is outmoded or otherwise
unworkable, we hope that they will at least say so, even if they
ultimately conclude that they are bound by the existing
precedent. But status quo bias and the endowment effect
suggest this will not happen. When given a pre-existing set of
legal rules, judges will be hesitant to move away from the
status quo (status quo bias) and will overvalue the intrinsic
worth of the existing rules (endowment effect). Because they
overvalue the benefits of the current rule, they will
correspondingly overestimate the costs of changing that rule.170
This blends into the problem of sticky default rules. As
Ben-Shahar and Pottow write in the context of contract law,
parties tend to be unwilling to deviate from default rules for
fear of being seen as manipulative or otherwise sneaky.171
Similarly, a judge who deviates from the given rule might be
seen as being “up to something,” or—quelle horreur!—an
activist. Even if judges don’t have a sinister motive, the
“stickiness” of default rules, in part because of the status quo
bias, endowment effect, and so on, suggests that the judge will
not deviate. Prentice and Koehler write about the “normality
bias”—that actors are seen as more blameworthy when they
take unusual actions than when they stick to the tried and
true.172 As a result, judges have a strong incentive not to deviate
168
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from tradition, because they would be seen as more
blameworthy if their novel rule proved unworkable. The
problem is compounded by the fact that we humans prefer suboptimal situations to the risk of “getting it wrong” and the
subsequent regret that might accompany choosing the nondefault option. Thus, even if judges did not have an ulterior
motive, and even if they were not concerned about being
“blamed” for deviating, they still might not depart from the
pre-existing rule, because they misperceive the risk of change
and the costs of regret.
Framing effects and path dependence further entrench
this problem. Recall that the framing effect suggests that the
answer to a particular question often depends on how it is
framed.173 Of particular importance and relevance here, the
framing effect is robust even among sophisticated respondents
and even when respondents believe their answers will have an
effect on policy choices.174 And then, of course, as particular
rules develop over time, path dependence suggests that they
will get entrenched.175 Pierson explains that path dependence is
particularly likely to occur in the context of “formal, changeresistant institutions,” a description that certainly applies to
the legal system.176
A recent article by Lindquist and Cross underscores this
177
point. The authors empirically tested the proposition that
judges’ decisions reflect their policy preferences and are
unconstrained by precedent.178 They found that precedent does
in fact constrain judges’ decision-making—but only in cases
that are not of first impression.179 In other words, once a
decision is made in a case of first impression, that rule tends to
stick.180 Stare decisis is defended on the ground that it controls
judges’ caprice. But Lindquist and Cross’s study suggests that
it simply entrenches a tremendous first mover advantage.

173
174

See supra Part III.A.4.
See Gonzalez et al., supra note 113, at 2; Kahneman & Tversky, supra note

116, at 343.
175

See supra Part III.A.5.
Pierson, supra note 119, at 252.
177
Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s
Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156 (2005).
178
Id. at 1158-59.
179
Id. at 1205-06.
180
Id. at 1183-84. I explore how a decision made in a case of first impression
“sticks” in my discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley, infra Part IV.A.1.
176
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Most noteworthy is that these biases often operate in
tandem. Consider a legal question to which a reasonable person
might answer X or Y. First-order path dependence teaches
that, if both outcomes are roughly equally reasonable, there is
no way to predict what a given court will do.181 However, if just
one court chooses Y, information cascades suggest that (at least
under certain circumstances), more and more people will start
choosing Y. Over time, it might become apparent that X was
the better option. But second-order path dependence predicts
that we will be unlikely to choose X.182 This prediction is
reinforced by status quo bias and the stickiness of default
rules: given a particular legal entitlement (“Y”), we will be
highly reluctant to move away from it.183 We might even
imagine that some judges, in good faith, evaluate X and Y and
weight the benefits of the correct rule against the costs of
change. However, the endowment effect suggests that even
these well-intentioned judges will overestimate the benefit of
sticking with Y and overestimate, as a result, the cost of
moving to X.
Our choice biases also interact with our attitudes and
motives. This is perhaps most vividly illustrated by the
intersection of system justification theory and status quo bias:
we start out predisposed to “preferring” the status quo, and
once we get accustomed to the status quo, we imbue it with a
sense of legitimacy. In this telling, we are even less likely to
move from Y to X, because, in addition to the incorrect
assessment of cost and benefit, we are subconsciously primed to
believe that X—merely by virtue of being different—is unjust
and unfair. Similarly, the motive to cohere and the motive to
simplify predict that, when an array of fact patterns come up
over time, judges are more likely to recast a given case in terms
of pre-existing precedent (“Y”), because doing so is simpler and
creates a coherent narrative.
If these cognitive biases have explanatory power, then
we might find ourselves in quite a bit of trouble. Under the
current system, lower courts are supposed to take precedent at
face value until altered. Moreover, stare decisis applies not
only to courts’ holdings but also their ratios decidendi—the
reasons for their decisions. But if judges (being, as they are,
181
182
183

See supra Part III.A.5.
See supra Part III.A.5.
See supra Part III.A.6.
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human) are using cognitive shortcuts, and if these shortcuts
are all skewing in the same direction, then we should be
suspicious of judges’ decisions and their stated reasons for
them.
About a decade ago, Eric Talley explored a partial
version of my hypothesis: he analyzed whether legal doctrine
could be explained as being the result of information cascades.
In setting up this inquiry, he wrote,
If common law precedent is in fact a type of [information] cascade, it
would represent the strongest refutation yet of the common law
efficiency hypothesis. Indeed, it would suggest that even if judges are
predisposed towards efficiency, and even if they do not face a biased
selection of cases, precedents might still frequently diverge from the
most efficient legal rule. Moreover, a theory of precedential herding
would force us to rethink the coherence of virtually any
jurisprudential theory of precedent that conceives of the common law
as a mechanism for judicial learning—be it economic or otherwise. If
precedent represents a weak or impoverished learning device, then a
common law system of adjudication seems unlikely to produce
reliable results.184

Thus far, the focus has been on courts’ use of stare
decisis essentially as a heuristic, one that might be leading to
suboptimal results, but in any event one whose epistemic basis
has been called into question. But there is another sense in
which adherence to precedent can be problematic. The
psychological phenomena catalogued do not only suggest that
stare decisis might be an unreliable guidepost for judicial
decision-making. They also suggest that adherence to
precedent may be serving as a “shield” for unjust or otherwise
undesirable results. Consider that the normality bias suggests
that decision-makers will be reluctant to deviate from the
norm: even if precedent has entrenched a rule that is unfair to
certain groups of people, a judge might feel that ruling against
that group makes her complicit in this injustice. But stare
decisis provides the necessary cover: “I’d like to help you, but
I’m bound by precedent to rule against you.”185 As Hanson and
184

Talley, supra note 82, at 91 (emphasis added). Talley ultimately concludes
that precedent cannot be fully explained by cascades, though he suggests that a more
complete story (that explains precedent in terms of biases beyond just cascades) might
be correct. See id. at 121-24. I respond to this point at the end of the Article. See infra
notes 376-382 and accompanying text.
185
See, e.g., Westlake Vinyls v. Goodrich Corp., No. 5:03-CV-00240-R, 2007
WL 1959168, at *3-4 (W.D. Ky. June 29, 2007) (“This court shares its sister district
courts’ ‘latent misgivings’ about the propriety of the rule announced in Goodyear, but
like those courts, is bound to apply governing Sixth Circuit precedent.”); United States
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Benforado have noted, the actor-observer bias tends to make us
blame the person when another person does something “bad”
(what a rotten judge!) but to blame the situation when we do
something bad (how could I be expected to defy precedent?).186
And so our biases and attributional proclivities suggest not
only that stare decisis might not be furthering the goals we
think it is but also that the system itself may be providing
“cover” to judges who render decisions they know may be
perceived as unjust.
Well, that’s the payoff. The correlated cognitive,
psychological, and situational phenomena I have outlined in
this Part, operating in tandem, strongly undercut the typical
arguments for stare decisis. We think that the received legal
rules are desirable (why would we have come to these decisions
if they were not?). But “survival does not imply present-day
superiority to untried alternatives.”187 In the balance of this
Article, I evaluate what implications this might have for law,
respond to some criticisms of my argument, and imagine what
a (jurisprudential) world might look like if stare decisis did not
have the weight it does today.
IV.

SOME PREDICTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY

A.

Predicting Bias

At this point, it is worth pausing and asking whether
this theoretical argument has practical significance. Are there
instances where reliance on stare decisis has produced
“skewed” results? In one sense, the question is difficult to
answer. For example, since Hadley v. Baxendale, a party who
breaches a contract is only liable for reasonably foreseeable
damages, not proximately caused damages.188 The practice of
stare decisis has entrenched this rule in our system, and it may
v. Pantoja, No. CR-05-164-FVS, 2006 WL 151939, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2006)
(noting that a recent Supreme Court case arguably supported the defendant’s position,
but that the district court was bound by Ninth Circuit precedent); Barclay v. Spitzer,
371 F. Supp. 2d 273, 274-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting, in the context of ineffective
assistance of counsel, that the New York State rule “seems more useful” than the
federal rule, but explaining that Second Circuit precedent binds it to use the latter).
186
Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How
Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 322
n.26 (2008).
187
Roe, supra note 125, at 644.
188
(1854) 9 Exch. 341, 342.
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or may not be preferable to the alternatives. However, even
among critics of Hadley’s rule,189 it would be hard to find some
unanimity as to why Hadley was wrong, and harder still to
determine if information cascades and status quo bias
entrenched the rule, as opposed to a good faith belief among
generations of judges that such a rule was preferable.
However, it is possible to find at least circumstantial
evidence of stare decisis producing results that are, if not
skewed, at least somewhat suspect. Assume that a court at
time t decides that, under certain circumstances, the correct
legal rule is X. Assume further that at time t+n1, another court
also holds X. Then, at t+n2, a third court holds X; at t+n3, a
fourth court holds X. These courts might be reaching the same
result because they believe the first rule was correct, or
because doing so leads to stability, or to preserve judicial
legitimacy. However, the entrenchment of the legal rule may
also be due to heuristic judgments by the subsequent courts.
There are several factors that could suggest that a
subsequent court is following the first court’s holding because it
is relying on stare decisis as a heuristic, rather than as a
means to preserve certain ostensibly desirable goals. I predict
that when the subsequent court’s decision reflects a heuristic
judgment, the decision is likely to have one or more of several
characteristics:
1. The subsequent court relies on the first court, even
though the first court’s decision is not binding on it.
2. The subsequent court engages in relatively little
legal analysis of the issue, whereas the first court engaged in
extensive analysis.
3. When there is ambiguity in the law, the subsequent
court resolves the ambiguity in such a way that supports the
decision of the first court.
4. The subsequent court—when the number of cases
following the first court is relatively high—justifies its decision
with reference to the large number of courts that have already
decided X.
5. The subsequent court relies relatively more on policy
considerations or generalized principles of law, rather than
more detailed textual or doctrinal analysis.

189

See, e.g., Symposium, The Common Law of Contracts as a World Force in
Two Ages of Revolution: A Conference Celebrating the 150th Anniversary of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 225 (2005).
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When a rule of law is unsettled or still developing, I
predict that several of these factors would be present in the
decisions of the various subsequent courts, providing strong
circumstantial evidence that the subsequent courts are using
stare decisis as a crutch, rather than as a mode of legal
reasoning that supports desirable outcomes. Of course, the list
of factors is not exhaustive and the phenomenon is not limited
to unsettled law. For example, when the rule of law has been
settled for a relatively long period of time, the subsequent court
might emphasize the destabilizing or disruptive impact that a
deviation from the received rule would have.
Although the list above is not intended to be exhaustive,
the factors set out above are derived from the behavioral data
catalogued in Part III. For example, in the music downloads
study,190 songs were downloaded more often (the “subsequent
court,” to use the construction above) when they were shown to
be popular on a list of top downloads. If a similar phenomenon
applied to judicial decision-making, I would predict that a
certain rule of law would become more entrenched when it was
shown to be the popular rule in other courts. Just as the
Southern District of New York is not obligated to follow the
rule of decision in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
someone downloading music in Lowenstein’s study was not
obligated to download the popular song.191 Following a trend
when it is not obligatory provides strong circumstantial
evidence of information cascades.
Along similar lines, system justification theory suggests
that judicial decisions are entrenched because we want to
believe that a legal system is fair and just. Subsequent courts
might be inclined to follow earlier cases by telling the
challenger that the status quo rule (made by the first court) is
the fairer and more just rule. Similarly, our motives to simplify
and cohere suggest that courts will be hostile to those who
challenge the precedential rule, because change is potentially
disruptive. Particularly in the face of ambiguity, these
phenomena suggest that our reasoning is motivated to create
simple and coherent narratives out of the facts before us, which
in turn suggests that courts will resolve ambiguity in favor of
the precedential rule. Risk aversion—and the tendency of

190
191

See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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courts (and others) to overestimate the costs of change—further
escalates this problem.
According to the case law, lower courts are obligated to
accept binding precedent at face value until altered. But the
cognitive and situational phenomena canvassed above suggest
that we humans will generally rely on “precedent”—that is, we
will defer to, and overvalue, existing rules and arrangements—
regardless of the doctrinal edicts that compel a judge to do so in
a particular case. Courts will rely on precedent, even when
they are not obligated to, as a cognitive shortcut, pushing the
law in directions that might be incorrect or otherwise socially
undesirable.
1. Testing the Prediction I: Section 304 of SarbanesOxley
In 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
response to the corporate scandals of the day.192 Among other
things, the law provided for so-called “clawbacks.” Under this
provision, in section 304 of the law,193 a company would be able
to recover certain compensation paid to its executives if
malfeasance was later revealed.194 Specifically, the law provided
that if an issuer filed a restatement because of misconduct
resulting in “material noncompliance” with financial reporting
requirements, then the company’s CEO and CFO would be
required to reimburse the issuer for (1) bonuses and other
compensation received in the twelve months following the first
filing of financials subject to a restatement; and (2) any profits
derived from the sale of the issuer’s securities during those
twelve months.195
However, section 304 did not specify who had the right
to enforce the provision. Some sections explicitly gave a
company’s shareholders the right to enforce the statutory
provision in question;196 other sections explicitly reserved
enforcement authority in the Securities and Exchange

192

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
193
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006).
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306, 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (explicitly affording a
private right of action in the insider trading context).
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Commission.197 Section 304 did neither. It was a classic “gray
area.” Predictably, in the years since SOX was enacted, section
304 has been the subject of many shareholder derivative suits.
The shareholder plaintiffs have argued that section 304 creates
an implied private right of action in their favor, and the
companies have argued that it does not.198
Eventually, the courts spoke on the question.199 The first
case to squarely address this issue was Neer v. Pelino, a 2005
case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.200 Neer
recognized that when a statute is unclear as to whether there
is a private right of action, courts must conduct a four-step
analysis, as the Supreme Court instructed in Cort v. Ash.201
Therefore, Neer analyzed the four “Cort factors” to determine
whether there was a private right of action under section 304.
The court examined the statutory text of section 304, the
legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley, and the relation of
section 304 to other provisions in the statute.202 Neer ultimately
concluded that there was no private right of action under
section 304 and dismissed that count of plaintiffs’ complaint for
failure to state a claim.203
So far, so good. But statutory analysis, it turns out, has
a lot in common with music downloads. Recall that in the study
by Salganik et al., songs would get downloaded more often if
the consumers were told that those songs were popular.204
197

See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 303, 15 U.S.C. § 7242 (explicitly giving the
SEC exclusive enforcement authority).
198
These were the litigants’ positions in all of the cases cited in this Part.
199
My case study focuses on the district courts to address this question. As of
this date, only one circuit court has squarely addressed the issue. See In re Digimarc
Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here is no private right
of action under section 304.”). Another case addresses the issue, but does so briefly
with little discussion. See Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v.
Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that section 304 “does not create a
private right of action”). I discuss the district court’s ruling in Digimarc in this Part.
However, for my purposes, it is not particularly relevant that the Ninth Circuit has
spoken to this issue. My overall thesis explores the development of this line of case law
at the district courts and, for the three-plus years between Neer and the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, Neer was the first district court case. In fact, Neer has not been cited and
Digimarc has been cited only three times in a reported case in the ten months since
Digimarc, suggesting that the issue is sufficiently resolved at this point as to not
necessitate further litigation. This underscores how the phenomena catalogued here
can be problematic for the development of the law, even when the pattern develops
only among district courts.
200
389 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
201
Id. at 652-53; see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
202
389 F. Supp. at 653-57.
203
Id. at 657-58.
204
See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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Information cascades are well-documented in other contexts.
What about in the law? The section 304 example shows federal
district courts across the country essentially following the rule
set forth in Neer, with little to no legal analysis of their own.
Over time, the Neer rule has become reinforced in the case law,
with subsequent courts referring to the large number of prior
courts that have reached the same conclusion as Neer. The
courts are following the leader, even though Neer is binding on
none of these courts. Although the subsequent cases tend to
recognize the statutory ambiguity, they uniformly resolve the
ambiguity in a way that supports Neer. As a result, every
subsequent case meets characteristics (1) and (3) above. I
discuss the post-Neer cases below.
Neer’s analysis spanned seven pages in the official
reporter.205 Since Neer, cases have resolved the issue in just a
few paragraphs, or sometimes just a sentence or two. The next
major case after Neer, In re BISYS Group, Inc. Derivative
Action, disposed of the issue in just two paragraphs with no
substantive legal analysis.206 Instead, the court summarily held:
[T]here is no private right of action under Section 304 of SarbanesOxley, substantially for the reasons stated in Neer. The question
whether creation of a private right of action under Section 304 might
have been a good idea is for Congress, which alone is charged with
making the close judgments and sometimes messy compromises
inherent in the legislative process.207

Thus, BISYS reflects factors (2) and (5) above: relatively little
legal analysis of the issue, and a reliance on policy
justifications in lieu of textual or doctrinal analysis.208
In In re Whitehall Jewellers, Inc. Shareholder Derivative
Litigation, the court laid out the Cort factors and discussed the

205

Neer, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 651-57.
In re BISYS Group, Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
207
Id. at 464.
208
The court’s comment that the issue is one for Congress is peculiar, because
the Supreme Court has indicated that courts may imply private rights of action under
certain circumstances. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Judge Kaplan might
(correctly) believe that the current Court disfavors implied rights of action and that he
should therefore disregard Cort. However, “[i]f a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the [lower court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to
[the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (emphasis added).
206
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issue more extensively than in BISYS.209 However, Whitehall
also demonstrates the beginnings of an information cascade
regarding section 304. First, the court wrote that it “is inclined
to concur with its colleagues in Neer and Bisys Group that no
private right of action is available under § 304 . . . .”210 Second,
although the court laid out the applicable doctrinal analysis, at
every juncture, it simply deferred to Neer or BISYS.211
Whitehall thus reflects at least factor (2), and to a lesser extent
(4)—reference to the number of courts that have already
reached a particular decision.212
Kogan v. Robinson, about eight months after Neer,
engaged in the most extensive analysis of any post-Neer case.213
However, even here, the legal analysis relies on Neer at every
turn.214 Additionally, the court refers to the fact that “all other
courts that have considered this issue[] . . . conclude[d] [that]
Section 304 does not explicitly create a private remedy.”215 And
when plaintiffs cited a Ninth Circuit case implying a right of
action in favor of shareholders, the court declined to follow it,
in part on policy grounds.216 Kogan noted that courts were more
likely to imply rights of action in the past.217 Because implied
rights of action are disfavored today, Kogan found the earlier
Ninth Circuit case distinguishable.218 Thus, despite its
relatively extensive analysis, Kogan reflects factors (4) and (5).
The result was the same in In re Digimarc Corp.
Derivative Litigation.219 The court noted plaintiffs’ argument
“that Section 304’s text, [SOX’s] statutory construction and
legislative history, and the purpose underlying Section 304 all
favor finding the existence of an implied private right of
209

In re Whitehall Jewellers, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 05 C 1050,
2006 WL 468012, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2006).
210
Id. at *8.
211
See id. at *7-8 & n.13 (“this court, too, agrees with Neer,” “[t]he Neer court
reached its conclusion,” “[t]he Neer court observed,” “[t]he Bisys Group court pointed
out that”).
212
Id. at *7 (noting that no court has “recognized an implied private right of
action”).
213
Kogan v. Robinson, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1078-82 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
214
See id. at 1079 (citing Neer twice); id. (“[a]s stated in Neer”); id. at 1082
(citing Neer).
215
Id. at 1078.
216
Id. at 1080.
217
Id.
218
See id.
219
In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 05-1324-HA (LEAD), 2006 WL
2345497 (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 549 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir.
2008).
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action.”220 The court responded with little legal analysis, writing
instead, “Every court that has considered the issue directly has
concluded that Section 304 contains no implied private right of
action.”221 Digimarc reflects factors (2) and (4).
The court in In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Derivative Litigation disposed of the section 304 issue in just
two paragraphs.222 Like its predecessors, the court relied on
Neer: “The Court is persuaded by the well-reasoned decision in
Neer v. Pelino.”223 Goodyear acknowledged that there was no
binding precedent on the issue.224 Therefore, it concluded, “this
Court is free to consider [Neer, Whitehall, Kogan, and
Digimarc] as persuasive authority on which it bases its
decision.”225 Of course, one might think that, “[i]n the absence of
binding authority,”226 it is more important for a district court to
analyze the legal claims anew, if only to provide a fuller
presentation of the legal issues for appeal. The court’s failure to
engage in such analysis underscores factor (1), and also reflects
factors (2) and (4).
In Pedroli ex rel. Microtune Inc. v. Bartek, the court
declined to imply a private right of action, pointing out that the
plaintiff was “ignoring the predominant holdings across the
country that the Act does not create a private cause of action
under § 304 . . . .”227 The court disposed of the issue in just two
paragraphs, concluding, “The court declines to address the
issue in any more detail and believes that the cases cited
conclusively mandate a dismissal of [the section 304]
Count . . . .”228 Pedroli also demonstrates numbers (2) and (4).
In re Infosonics Corp. Derivative Litigation reflects
factor (2) and especially (3).229 First, the court deferred to Neer
and Kogan, addressing the issue in just two paragraphs.230
220

Id. at *2.
Id.
222
In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Derivative Litig., Nos. 5:03CV2180,
5:03CV2204, 5:03CV2374, 5:03CV2468, 5:03CV2469, 2007 WL 43557, at *7-8 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 5, 2007).
223
Id. at *7.
224
See id.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Pedroli ex rel. Microtune, Inc. v. Bartek, 564 F. Supp. 2d. 683, 686 (E.D.
Tex. 2008) (citing Neer, BISYS, Kogan, Whitehall, and Digimarc).
228
Id.
229
In re Infosonics Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 06cv1336 BTM(WMc), 2007
WL 2572276, at *8-9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2007).
230
Id.
221
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Second, it noted that Congress could have been explicit about
creating a private right, just as it was in section 306.231 Of
course, it is just as true that if Congress wanted to foreclose a
private right, it could have done so explicitly, just as it did in
section 303.232 The court thus resolved the statute’s ambiguity
in favor of the earlier, non-binding cases.233 This underscores
factor (3).
The In re Diebold Derivative Litigation case disposed of
the section 304 claim in just one paragraph, with no legal
reasoning at all, writing:
Every court that has considered whether SOX § 304 provides a
private right of action has answered that question in the negative
[citing Neer, BISYS, Kogan, and Goodyear]. Th[is] [c]ourt agrees,
and finds that SOX § 304 does not create an implied private right of
action.234

Unsurprisingly, Diebold reflects factors (2) and (4) above.
However, it is interesting to note that Diebold, decided in 2008,
gave no special weight to Goodyear, decided in 2007 by the
same court. In theory, horizontal stare decisis requires a court
to adhere to its prior decisions.235 Therefore, Diebold could have
disposed of the issue by writing, “Until and unless the Sixth
Circuit instructs otherwise, this court is obligated to follow its
prior decisions. Accordingly, there is no private right of action
under section 304, as stated in Goodyear.” The fact that
Diebold gives no special weight to Goodyear (mentioning it only
at the end of a string-cite)236 gives additional support for the
conclusion that Diebold’s conclusion is based on a heuristic
judgment, rather than bona fide legal analysis.
The court in In re iBasis, Inc. Derivative Litigation
recognized the tension between sections 303, 304, and 306.237
But that court also deferred to “all other courts that have had
the occasion to address the issue directly” and “found that
Congress did not create a private right of action for purposes of

231

Id.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 303, 15 U.S.C. § 7242 (2006).
233
In re Infosonics, 2007 WL 2572276, at *9.
234
In re Diebold Derivative Litig., Nos. 5:06CV0233, 5:06CV0418, 2008 WL
564824, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 29, 2008) (citations to Neer, BISYS, Kogan, and
Goodyear omitted).
235
See, e.g., Nash & Pardo, supra note 19, at 1750-51.
236
In re Diebold, 2008 WL 564834, at *2.
237
In re iBasis, Inc. Derivative Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 214, 224 (D. Mass. 2007).
232
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enforcing section 304 of SOX.”238 The court went on to cite
Goodyear, Digimarc, Kogan, Whitehall, BISYS, and Neer and
was “persuaded by . . . precedent from other courts that have
directly and thoughtfully considered the issue.”239
The iBasis decision is interesting on two levels. First, it
reflects factors (2) and (4). However, it goes further. iBasis not
only cites the cases above but also credits the “direct[] and
thoughtful[] consideration” those cases gave to “the issue” of
whether SOX § 304 contains an implied private right of
action.240 This reference is striking because, as discussed above,
almost none of the cited cases engage in “direct[] and
thoughtful[] consideration”241 of the issue. Instead, most of the
cases discuss the issue briefly, with little or no legal analysis,
deferring almost categorically to Neer.
At this point, it is worth reiterating Posner and
Sunstein’s argument:
If two states have adopted a law, or if two state courts have made
some innovation, a third may do so, not because of any kind of
independent judgment, but because it is following its predecessors.
And if three states have made the same decision, a cascade might be
forming. The problem is that subsequent states might assume that
decisions have been made independently, even though most have
been following the crowd.242

The cases discussed in the section 304 example
demonstrate, to varying degrees, all of the features that I
predict would be present when later courts are following an
earlier court out of cognitive bias. The case study provides
strong support for the hypothesis that, at least sometimes,
courts defer to prior decisions because doing so is quick and
easy—not because doing so leads to the best results.243

238

Id.
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2. Testing the Prediction II: The First and Fourth
Amendments
In one sense, heuristic judgments should be less
common at the Supreme Court. The court has the luxury of
deciding which cases it will hear, so it can manage its resources
in a way that other courts cannot. If heuristics are a way of
dealing with scarce cognitive (judicial) resources, then we
should expect to find such biases less prevalent when resources
are greater. Similarly, Supreme Court Justices (and law clerks)
may, aware of the importance of their work, be especially
careful not to take shortcuts, cognitive or otherwise.
But at the same time, other considerations suggest that
the Supreme Court might be more prone to biases and
heuristics. First, the Court is final; it is bound by no other
court, as reflected in Justice Jackson’s famous quote, “We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only
because we are final.”244 A lower court might rationalize its
reliance on precedent on the basis of the doctrinal rules that
obligate it to reach a particular result. The Supreme Court,
answerable (at least formally) to no institution but itself, might
actually be more susceptible to bias because it is not bound by
any sort of frequent check.
Second, as Richard Posner points out, at least in
constitutional cases, the Supreme Court is not bound by any
“law” at all. Posner writes,
The Supreme Court, when it is deciding constitutional cases, is
political in the sense of having and exercising discretionary power as
capacious as a legislature’s. It cannot abdicate that power, for there
is nothing on which to draw to decide constitutional cases of any
novelty other than discretionary judgment. To such cases the
constitutional text and history, and the pronouncements in past
opinions, do not speak clearly. Such cases occupy a broad open area
where the conventional legal materials of decision run out and the
Justices, deprived of those crutches, have to make a discretionary
call.
Constitutional cases in the open area are aptly regarded as
“political” because the Constitution is about politics and because
cases in the open area are not susceptible of confident evaluation on
the basis of professional legal norms. They can be decided only on
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the basis of a political judgment, and a political judgment cannot be
called right or wrong by reference to legal norms.245

My assertion here is not that the Supreme Court’s
position of finality renders it incapable of making “bias-free”
judgments. I am making a different point: although the Court’s
position situates it different from the lower courts, it is still
susceptible to heuristics and biases.
The evolution of three lines of Supreme Court
precedent, in the context of the First and Fourth Amendments,
demonstrates such judgments. In a recent series of articles,
Anuj Desai explains how certain First and Fourth Amendment
constitutional doctrines can only be properly understood with
the statutory history of the United States Postal Service in
mind. When early Post Office cases came to the Court, they
were properly decided with reference to the statutes that
Congress had enacted governing the Post Office. However,
those cases implicated broader policy issues regarding free
expression and privacy. Later, when constitutional questions
implicating free expression and privacy arose, the Supreme
Court followed its earlier Post Office decisions—even though
those decisions were based on the unique institutional context
of the Post Office and were not squarely on all fours with the
constitutional cases. The Constitution makes no mention of a
First Amendment “right to receive” ideas,246 and it does not
restrict government subsidies in connections with the mail.247
And the Fourth Amendment does not specify that
correspondence between persons is subject to a right to
privacy.248 Yet these (judge-made) doctrines exist today—and
they all have their origins in Post Office policy.
Professor Desai outlines the process by which
constitutional law can follow legislative choices thusly: “(1)
Congress passes a statute; (2) the statutory provision gives an
institution certain attributes; (3) over time, social practice
embeds those attributes into the institution; and (4) the courts

245
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then take those attributes and write them into constitutional
law.”249
Desai chronicles how this process manifested itself in
connection with the Post Office. First, the legislature embedded
certain republican principles (a right to privacy in the mails, a
right to receive ideas) into the institution.250 Over the years,
these principles became ingrained into societal expectations
about how the Post Office should operate. Eventually, the
Supreme Court held that these principles were constitutionally
required.251 The Supreme Court effectively raised Post Office
statutes to the level of Constitutional law.
This kind of evolution supports my thesis. The Supreme
Court elevates Post Office policy to constitutional law, not
because of some strong consensus that the Post Office statute
from 1792 reflects our understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, but because it is following precedent, trying to
minimize doctrinal conflicts, and relying on case law even
though it arose in a distinct context. The Court’s reliance on
stare decisis is, at least in part, the reflection of heuristics and
biases. Over the next several pages, I summarize two of Desai’s
articles, showing how this evolution took place. I then explain
in some more detail how this story supports my thesis.
This story starts in the 1770s, when revolution was
brewing in the colonies. The existing British postal system had
no notion of privacy of correspondence. Indeed, the British
government regularly opened citizens’ mail in order to gather
intelligence on “conspiracies.”252 Though it was officially illegal
to open mail without a warrant, warrants were issued secretly
and could often contain hundreds of names.253 As one historian
stated, “secrecy made legality unimportant.”254
Not only was confidentiality of the mail compromised,
those who controlled the postal networks could also control
what was allowed through the networks. Postmasters would
exploit their position to block competing newspaper publishers
from using the postal service.255 As tensions rose between the
249
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British and the colonists, the nature of this blocking became
political.256
This regular opening of private correspondence posed a
special problem for American rebels, who had to ensure privacy
of correspondence to carry on their plans for the Revolution.
Further, their inability to use the postal service to distribute
their newspapers discouraged the American rebels from
communicating their ideas to a larger audience. In response,
they adopted an alternate mail system, the “constitutional
post,” established by William Goddard, a Philadelphia
newspaperman.257 Goddard realized the importance of the
postal network for securely transmitting private information as
well as for transmitting news and ideas to the populace. In his
proposal to establish the “constitutional post,” he wrote, “It is
not only our letters that are liable to be stopped and opened by
a ministerial mandate, and their contents construed into
treasonable conspiracies, but our newspapers, those necessary
and important alarms in time of publick danger, may be
rendered of little consequence for want of circulation.”258 His
goals coincided with those of the American revolutionaries—
freedom to express ideas without fear of being accused of
treason.259
In 1782, the Continental Congress passed a postal
ordinance that codified this desire for freedom of
correspondence.260 The ordinance prohibited postal officials from
opening the mail without “an express warrant.”261 The
ordinance also called for “moderate rates” for the mailing of
newspapers.262 After the ratification of the Constitution,
Congress passed the Post Office Act of 1792.263 The Act
contained a similar provision for privacy of correspondence,
which passed without controversy or even much discussion.264
However, debate arose around two issues involving
newspapers. One issue revolved around whether to allow all
newspapers to be circulated or whether to selectively admit
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
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certain newspapers.265 The second issue was what rate should
be charged for mailing newspapers.266 Eventually, Congress
voted against selective admission, based on fears that the
policy would be used by the postmasters to discriminate
against publications they disagreed with.267 As for rates, the
legislature decided on reduced rates for newspaper subscribers,
mostly subsidized by letter writers.268 This newspaper subsidy
was based on the idea that in a republic, it was the
government’s responsibility to ensure citizens have access to
information about public affairs.269 The passage of this Act set
in motion important policies that would shape the Post Office
as an institution, and eventually shape constitutional law.270
Another consequence of the 1792 Post Office Act was the
formation of a functional monopoly of the Post Office.271 This
happened because Congress chose to retain the power to
designate postal routes.272 This power gave representatives a
chance to bring back tangible benefits to their district in the
form of a Post Office and mail service—what we might today
call congressional “pork.” Naturally, this led to the rapid
proliferation of postal routes, even to areas with very small
populations. This ubiquity of mail routes made the Post Office
the most effective conveyor of information across long
distances, leading to a “practical dependence of the public upon
the [P]ost [O]ffice,” as Justice Holmes would later state.273 This
effective monopoly had later implications for constitutional
law.274
Desai emphasizes that privacy of correspondence and
subsidized rates for newspapers both developed independently
of the Constitution.275 These republican principles had already
been written into the 1782 Postal Ordinance, and the
Constitution was ratified in 1789. Thus, the principles of
privacy of correspondence and newspaper subsidies pre-dated
the Constitution.
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
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How then did this minor postal act find its way into
constitutional law? Tracking Desai, I address each principle
separately—the Fourth Amendment principle of privacy of
correspondence, First Amendment restrictions on government
subsidies, and the First Amendment “right to receive” ideas.
Privacy of correspondence was first addressed in Ex
Parte Jackson.276 Though the case is primarily seen today
through the lens of its First Amendment implications, Desai
points out that this is the first case in which the Court
acknowledged a right to privacy of correspondence.277 The fact
pattern of the case had nothing to do with the opening of sealed
letters—the petitioner, Orlando Jackson, had been convicted
for mailing information about a lottery.278 The case mainly
revolved around whether the government had the right to
prevent certain materials deemed “unmailable” from being
mailed.279 The Court eventually upheld the statute and
Jackson’s conviction.280 However, the majority added in dictum
that it could not enforce the statute by opening sealed letters.281
It is this dictum that first addresses the issue of privacy of
correspondence: “[A] distinction is to be made . . . between what
is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and
sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open to
inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and
other printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be
examined.”282
The Court further stated, “The constitutional guaranty
of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers,
thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.”283 Desai
claims that the Court “effectively characterized a letter passing
through the mail system as the sender’s ‘papers’ for Fourth
Amendment purposes.”284 The principle of privacy of mail
276
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correspondence was thus constitutionalized. “Justice Field saw
in the Fourth Amendment not what the constitutional drafters
had put there, but instead what postal policymakers had
incorporated into the structure of the Post Office.”285 This
judicial interpretation based on the Post Office is an example of
path dependence and risk aversion—the traditions of an
institution becoming reinforced over time because people prefer
the less risky path of status quo. This principle of privacy of
correspondence as applied to mail was simply announced as a
self-evident truth, even though no mention of it had appeared
in the Constitution, and even though the notion itself was new
th
in the 18 century.
Milwaukee Leader286 and Hannegan v. Esquire287 provide
examples of how the Supreme Court made postal subsidies for
newspapers a matter of constitutional law.288 The Milwaukee
Leader case involved a Socialist newspaper that was denied
subsidized mailing rates, because it was deemed
“nonmailable.”289 The Court held that the newspaper could be
denied the subsidized rate.290 In his dissent, Justice Brandeis
characterized the denial of the subsidy as akin to a “penalty” or
“fine.”291 He further stated that such discrimination was
“effective censorship.”292 Desai points out that Brandeis’s
reasoning was closely entwined with particular attributes
about the Post Office itself.293 Specifically, the monopoly that
the Post Office held over long distance communication, and the
subsidies provided to other publications, would likely cause the
newspaper to lose money and fold.294 Brandeis’s reasoning is
dependent on this institutional context—and tends to reflect
the operation of some of the cognitive biases described above.
For example, it is not necessarily the case that denying a
subsidy to this newspaper is effective censorship; it might be
285
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distributed through means other than the Post Office.
Brandeis’s reliance on the institutional characteristics to make
a broader point, unrelated to the institution, reflect a motive to
simplify.
Hannegan v. Esquire focused on a similar question:
whether the Postmaster General had the power to determine
what was eligible for subsidized second-class mailing rates.295 In
this case, the Postmaster had determined that Esquire
magazine was not entitled to second class rates because it was
deemed sexually explicit.296 This time, the Court ruled that the
Postmaster did not have the power to decide which publications
were eligible for subsidized mailings.297 The Court stated that to
give the Postmaster that power would amount to censorship,
and to give a government official the power to decide “[w]hat is
good literature, what has educational value, what is refined
public information, [or] what is good art . . . smacks of an
ideology foreign to our system.”298 Desai points out that such an
assertion, taken out of the context of the Post Office, is simply
wrong.299 For example, public university professors and public
school teachers are hired specifically for the purpose of deciding
what is good literature or has educational value.300 Again, the
Court relies on the institutional context of the Post Office to
explain its reasoning, even though its conclusions are not
related to the Post Office.301
It is interesting to think about what the court might
decide if Congress had decided not to subsidize newspapers, or
to charge newspapers according to the distance the paper
traveled. Would the issue then become one of whether
subscribers living too far away are being denied their free
speech rights? The point, of course, is not that these decisions
were substantively incorrect; instead, it is that this reasoning
reveals a tendency to use existing non-binding rules to justify
subsequent decisions. The notion that newspapers had a right
to subsidized postage was not mentioned in the Constitution.
Yet somewhere along the line it became a conventional truth.
295
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The Court even referred to “our traditions” of providing
newspaper subsidies.302
The Post Office’s monopoly over long distance
communication makes its way into Lamont v. Postmaster
General.303 By the 1920s, the Post Office’s monopoly over long
distance communication was such an entrenched reality that
the reasoning of the case was shaped around that fact.304
Though the Court did not allude much to the Post Office, one
can see their dependence on that specific institution by looking
at how the Court dealt with the “right to receive” in a different
case, Board of Education v. Pico.305 In that case, the attempt to
apply the “right to receive” to books in a public school library
did not succeed.306 The analogy failed because most of the
Justices felt the institutional differences between the Post
Office and public schools were too great.307 The notion that the
Post Office constituted a monopoly played a large part in the
development of the “right to receive” doctrine. According to
then-Justice Rehnquist, if a person could not receive materials
through the mail, it was the equivalent of a “complete denial of
access to the ideas sought,”308 because the Post Office
constituted an effective monopoly. Desai points out that
Rehnquist makes an overstatement—a person could indeed
receive ideas through other avenues (something that is
probably even more true today).309 Rehnquist’s reasoning
reveals a motive to simplify, a preference for the simpler of two
explanations. The inability to receive materials in the mail only
constituted a “complete denial” in the context of the
monopolistic Post Office. For example, if the Post Office Act of
1792 had instead ceded power to the Executive to designate
postal routes, and as a result our postal service had been much
smaller, the “right to receive” may very well not have
developed, at least in the context of receiving mail. Thus, the
reasoning behind the “right to receive” cannot be divorced from
its institutional underpinnings.
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So what is happening here? How do ideas that were
novel in the eighteenth century, having nothing to do with
constitutional law, become a matter of constitutional law in the
twentieth? Let us return to the late eighteenth century, when
the new American republicans had recently escaped the
clutches of British rule. A framing effect may have affected
their decision-making when it came to Post Office policy. Recall
that a framing effect is observed when a decision maker’s
choices are affected by the way those choices are described.310
Faced with a decision to either allow all newspapers to be
published or only some newspapers to be published, the
decision makers chose to allow all newspapers to be published.
Each decision was viable—proponents of selective admission
argued that newspapers overburdened the mail system, which
was “by no means an idle concern.”311 Those who supported
universal admission argued that those in power could
discriminate against those who were not, an idea borne out by
the history of British blocking of newspapers.312 When the issue
was framed as “what the British did” versus “what the British
didn’t do,” the decision makers were bound to choose the
positively framed choice—“what the British didn’t do.”
This new idea, that all newspapers should be published
regardless of content, was accepted as “tradition” by the
twentieth century.313 This may have been path dependence at
work: our current perception of political and economic
outcomes determined by the timing in which the earlier
decision was made. So, over time, this initial decision to
universally accept all newspapers (itself the result of a framing
effect), became Post Office tradition.
Finally, once this idea had become entrenched Post
Office tradition, a series of heuristics may have further
entrenched it into constitutional law. Using the typology above,
I argue that these cases reflect factor (1), because the Post
Office cases were clearly not binding on the subsequent
constitutional cases. To an extent, the cases also reflect factor
(2), because the prior legal analysis regarding the Post Office
effectively got “imported” into the constitutional cases. The
motives to simplify and cohere are also at play. If the Court
had started anew with the constitutional cases (not an
310
311
312
313
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unreasonable proposition, since the cases were, after all, ones
of first impression), arguably similar cases could have spawned
multiple lines of doctrinal development. Adopting the Post
Office line of doctrine in constitutional cases led to case law
that was not only simpler (fewer lines of doctrine) but also
more coherent (a single story to explain disparate phenomena).
Over time, path dependence led us to apply these early
precedents in cases that have nothing to with their origin. For
example, the Ninth Circuit has recently held that an individual
has a privacy interest in the contents of a text message, but not
the number to which he was sending the text message.314 One
has no such privacy interest because he has no such
expectation in the to/from e-mail address in an e-mail message.
And that is so because one has a privacy interest in his
telephone conversation but not the numbers he has dialed. And
that is so because—you see where this is going—you have a
privacy interest in your letters, but not the address on the
outside.315
The point is not that these decisions are incorrect or
even that they would not have come about in the absence of the
early Post Office cases. Desai repeatedly, and explicitly, says
that our existing set of doctrinal rules could very well have
come about even in the absence of the Post Office statutes and
cases.316 This underscores my overall theme in this Article: the
fact that stare decisis reflects cognitive bias, in theory or in
practice, does not necessarily mean that the decisions reached
are incorrect. It merely means that we should be particularly
vigilant about our reliance on prior decisions.
3. Testing the Prediction III: The Global War on Terror
Over the course of this Article, I have used the terms
“precedent” and “stare decisis” mostly interchangeably, though
doctrinally, there is a slight difference between the two (which
is not relevant here).317 However, the idea of precedent, loosely
defined, affects decision-making in all sorts of contexts beyond
the law. Although this Article takes aim at the doctrine of
314

See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 904-05.
316
See, e.g., Desai, Transformation, supra note 246 at 702 (“Although I do
argue that the Post Office’s characteristics were embedded into the fabric of
constitutional doctrine, I am not arguing that we would not have these two doctrines
today without their origins in postal policy.”).
317
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
315

2009]

STARE DECISIS IS COGNITIVE ERROR

123

precedent in the law as commonly understood, it has broader
application as well. As Schauer points out,
Appeals to precedent do not reside exclusively in courts of law.
Forms of argument that may be concentrated in the legal system are
rarely isolated there, and the argument from precedent is a prime
example of the nonexclusivity of what used to be called “legal
reasoning.” . . . In countless instances, out of law as well as in, the
fact that something was done before provides, by itself, a reason for
doing it that way again.318

The implications of my argument are reflected in a
series of decisions regarding the Global War on Terror
(GWOT). Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the United States began detaining suspected terrorists at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.319 Two related issues arose: first, the
permissible legal limits of the interrogation techniques the
federal government could use against the detainees, and
second, what, if any, legal process the detainees would have
access to, including rights to habeas corpus or similar
procedures.320 It is no exaggeration to say that the GWOT is
unprecedented in its nature and scope. This novel situation
provides a good test of the arguments I have advanced in this
Article.
In the first example, the government had to determine
what interrogation techniques the military and intelligence
officers could use on the detainees. By way of federal criminal
law and international agreements, the United States was
bound not to use “torture.”321 John Yoo, then at the Department
of Justice, was given the unenviable task of defining what
exactly constituted torture.
Yoo has since been reviled by many for his callous
formulation of what constituted torture.322 Yoo explained that
one of the elements of torture was “severe pain or suffering”
and that, “to constitute torture[,] ‘severe pain’ must rise to . . .
318
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the level that would ordinarily be associated with a physical
condition or injury sufficiently serious that it would result in
death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body
functions.”323 Far from reflecting Yoo’s heartlessness, however,
the phrase reflects his susceptibility to the heuristics that
affect all of us.
As Yoo pointed out in an interview a few years after he
authored the now-infamous memo, the question he faced in
defining “severe pain or suffering” was, “has Congress ever
used this phrase anywhere before?”324 Yoo found that Congress
had in fact defined the phrase, in a statute that Yoo “th[ought]
[] was about health care.”325 But there was more; the
interviewer pressed Yoo on the issue:
Esquire [Magazine interviewer]: John, you’re a very engaging guy, I
like you—I can’t picture you writing that phrase “organ failure or
death.”
Yoo: It’s the phrase Congress used. The main criticism, which is
certainly fair, is that statute is so different from this one, how can
you borrow the language of one and include it in the other. On the
other hand, that’s the closest you can get to any definition of that
phrase at all.326

The section of the memo that analyzed the meaning of
“severe pain or suffering” is relatively short, less than a page of
single-spaced text.327 The analysis began by noting that simple
“pain or suffering” would be insufficient to constitute torture;
18 U.S.C. § 2340 requires that such pain or suffering be
“severe.”328 The statute, however, does not define “severe.” Yoo
looked in two places to determine the definition of “severe . . .
pain or suffering.”329 First, the memo laid out the dictionary
definitions of severe.330 Second, the memo explained how the
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324
“Torture Memo” Author John Yoo Responds to This Week’s Revelations,
ESQUIRE, Apr. 3, 2008, available at http://www.esquire.com/the-side/qa/john-yoo-responds.
325
Id.
326
Id. (emphasis added).
327
Yoo, supra note 323, at 38-39.
328
Id. at 38 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2340 (2006)).
329
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
330
Id.
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phrase “severe pain” was used in another Congressional
statute:331
Congress’s use of the phrase “severe pain” elsewhere in the U. S.
Code can shed more light on its meaning. See, e.g., West Va. Univ.
Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) (“[W]e construe [a
statutory term] to contain that permissible meaning which fits most
logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and
subsequently enacted law.”).332

Yoo notes that in “statutes defining an emergency
medical condition for the purpose of providing health
benefits,”333 “severe pain” is treated “as an indicator of ailments
that are likely to result in permanent and serious physical
damage in the absence of immediate medical treatment. Such
damage must rise to the level of death, organ failure, or the
permanent, impairment of a significant body function.”334
There are two points I want to make regarding Yoo’s
analysis. First, as the case cited by Yoo itself notes, a statutory
term is to be given a uniform definition across contexts only
when doing so “fits . . . logically.”335 Arguably, using a definition
relating emergency medical services in the torture context does
not fit logically, and attempting to make it fit reflects the
motives to cohere and simplify.
Second, and more to the point, Yoo’s conclusion reflects
at least factors (1), (2), and (3) laid out at the beginning of this
Part. Obviously, Yoo’s memo is not a judicial decision, but the
same principles apply. The analysis reflects factor (1) because
Yoo is relying on prior analysis that is not binding in the
“instant case.” In other words, the language Yoo relies on is not
from any case involving torture, or even criminal law. There
may have been reasons for doing so,336 but the fact remains that
what Yoo relied on was not on point.
Yoo’s memo also reflects factor (2), a relative lack of
legal analysis. The background on § 2340 (and 2340A) and the
discussion of the specific intent requirement are about twice as
331

Id.
Id.
333
Id.
334
Id.
335
W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991)
336
See Yoo, supra note 323, at 38 (“Although the[] [other] statutes address a
substantially different subject from section 2340, they are nonetheless helpful for
understanding what constitutes severe physical pain.”). Note, however, that Yoo does
not explain why the other statutes are helpful; the sole reason appears to be that the
other statute happens to use the phrase “severe pain.”
332
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long as the section on “severe physical pain.”337 About half of the
section on physical pain simply recites the dictionary definition
of the word “severe,” and the only legal analysis on point is the
discussion of the (arguably irrelevant) statutes.338
Finally, Yoo’s memo reflects factor (3), resolving
ambiguity in favor of the extant law. It is not unreasonable to
think that the “unprecedented” attacks of September 11th
would result in (and might even require) a legal analysis that
did not rely on pre-existing doctrines and pre-existing, but
unrelated, legal categories.
These kinds of judgments, however, are precisely what
my hypothesis would predict. Relying on “precedent” applies to
all kinds of legal reasoning, not just judicial opinions. The
motive to cohere and the motive to simplify are at work; the
same standard is applied across contexts because doing so
simplifies the realm of legal doctrine and brings coherence to
an ambiguous area of torture law. The availability heuristic is
also prominent: Yoo’s memo relies on the readily available
formulation even though it did not, even by his own admission,
bear directly on the issue at hand.
The GWOT provides another occasion to examine the
Supreme Court’s use of arguments about precedent. First, the
mere fact that something has not previously been done is an
argumentative trump, even at the Supreme Court.339 Second,
this mode of reasoning applied even in cases raising questions
about enemy combatants’ due process rights. In Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
responded to Justice Stevens’s dissent by writing, “the dissent
cannot cite a single case in which we have deviated from the
longstanding rule we reaffirm today.”340 Justice Scalia,
dissenting in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, complained that the
majority “cannot cite a single case in the history of AngloAmerican law (before today) in which a jurisdiction-stripping
provision was denied immediate effect in pending cases . . . .”341
In both cases, the absence of a case on point was a crucial, if
337

See id. at 34-39.
See id. at 38-39.
339
See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 222 (2007) (“[R]espondents cite no
case interpreting this provision” the way they do); Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544
U.S. 228, 247 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Smith “cites no case for this proposition”);
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 26 (2002) (“Respondent fails to cite a single case from this
Court” supporting its position).
340
542 U.S. 426, 449 (2004).
341
548 U.S. 557, 659 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
338
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not dispositive, argument, so important that the relevant words
were italicized. Yet, just as with Yoo’s memos, one might think
that the GWOT might require novel legal or analytical
approach.
Yoo’s goal in writing the memo was to provide brightline rules regarding torture.342 This may or may not be a
worthwhile goal. But my point is a different one: even in a war
that presented “unprecedented dangers,”343 a critical juncture of
the issue presented—how much physical pain is so severe as to
constitute torture—relies on quite ordinary, and to some extent
cursory, legal analysis. Although the importance of the law and
policy issues at stake prompted careful legal analysis, it was
impossible to completely eliminate the effect of cognitive bias
on the legal conclusions. This underscores my overall point. It’s
not only difficult to overcome these cognitive biases: because
the biases operate subconsciously, it is often impossible.
B.

Truth or Stability?344

Earlier, I quoted Adrian Vermeule and pointed out that
“[t]he key point is not that judges are likely to get things
wrong; it is that when they do get things wrong, they are likely
to err in systematic rather than random ways.”345 Vermeule’s
point applies to my analysis as well. The key point is not just
that we humans have certain cognitive biases; it is that when
our decisions are skewed, they are likely to be skewed in
systematic rather than in random ways.346

342

See “Torture Memo” Author John Yoo Responds to This Week’s Revelations,
supra note 324.
343
George W. Bush, U.S. President, The President’s State of the Union
Address (Jan. 29, 2002).
344
Thanks to Zachary Clopton and Frederick Schauer for (separately)
highlighting this issue for me.
345
Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1501.
346
This is not to suggest that there are not countervailing cognitive biases.
For example, some combination of optimism bias and overconfidence may lead
individuals to shun existing arrangements in favor of their own, idiosyncratic views.
See, e.g., Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, On the Evolution of Overconfidence and
Entrepreneurs 1-2 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 00-48, 2001), available at
http://ssrn.com/papers=275516. Bernardo and Welch argue that the overconfident—
those who, presumably, are less likely to exhibit the biases I describe in Part III.A—are
more likely to be entrepreneurs and risk-takers. See generally id. There are two
responses. First, the literature demonstrates far more “backward-looking” biases than
“forward-looking” biases. Second, the people Bernardo and Welch identify are, by
definition, the exception. My Article, on the other hand, is aimed at the characteristics
that are reflected in most people’s behavior, most of the time.
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Then the question is, “So what?” Maybe our expressed
preferences—as humans, as citizens, as lawyers—are unduly
weighted toward the past. Is this really problematic? Maybe
the law is “wrong” as measured against some idealized notion
of humans’ preferences (if such an ideal could even be
extrapolated), but this may not pose any practical problems. If
the law is not meant to embody some intrinsic truth, but
instead is merely meant to be stable and predictable, then this
problem seems illusory.
For example, if we are not concerned about the
substantive content of the law, then it does not matter whether
there is an implied private right of action under section 304 or
not. So long as a rule is established, and relatively unlikely to
change over time, then the law is at least stable and
corporations and shareholders can act accordingly. For
example, instead of repeatedly litigating the section 304
question, shareholders might focus on other causes of action
and thus save resources. Moreover, acute awareness of the
possibility of bias might require judges to constantly reevaluate legal rules, putting the rules in a state of flux and
making them unpredictable and unstable.
However, I argue that this problem is overblown. Even
if law is merely meant to foster stability, and even if we are
completely agnostic about the substantive content of the law,
my analysis poses problems with the doctrine of stare decisis
whether we are concerned about truth, stability, or both.
C.

Problems in Both Cases, and Some Solutions

Imagine that you have a gun that, due to some
mechanical error, always fires slightly (but somewhat
I should note (as may already be apparent to some readers!) that my
analysis is not perfect. One hundred percent of the population is not biased toward the
status quo; some people may buck the trend in the face of even the most forceful
cascade. Just because most people will demonstrate some quality most of the time does
not mean all people will do so all of the time. However, as Hanson and Yosifon write in
The Situation,
[T]o best promote human understanding and well-being, legal theories must
be anchored in a reality-based understanding of human thinking and
behavior. Realism, we think, is critical. To be realists, on this telling, means
to begin with real humans and to build models from there, rather than to
begin with models and then view and interpret humans through them.
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 20, at 183. Even if there are exceptions,
policymaking must generally be based on how most people will react to a given
situation.
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unpredictably) to the left of where it is aimed. Now imagine
that the error is brought to your attention. What do you do?
Broadly speaking, there are three options. First, you might
decide that your gun’s aim is off enough that you buy a new
gun, one that does not have this error. Second, you might
decide that the slight unpredictability is not reason enough to
buy a new gun, so you will just aim slightly to the right from
now on and correct the gun’s bias. Finally, you might decide
that you generally want to shoot to the left anyway, and that
therefore you won’t change much at all. The gun’s “leftness” is
a good thing to be aware of, but since it generally gets you
where you want to wind up, it is not going to affect your
actions.
This analogy tracks the argument made in this Article.
The evidence put forth in Part III suggests that our court
decisions will tend, for situational and psychological reasons, to
be rooted in history, tradition, and precedent. The theory I
infer predicts that we will choose these existing arrangements,
not because they are the best of all possible worlds, but merely
because they exist. In other words, our jurisprudential gun will
always shoot slightly to the left. However, the evidence does
not provide perfect predictive power. Precedent is sometimes
disregarded and cases do get overruled. Thus, although our
decisions are rooted in the past, it is not possible to predict
with complete certainty how firm the roots are and when they
will be broken.
And so, broadly speaking, there are three alternatives. I
term these the strong case, the middle case, and the weaker
case. In the strong case, stare decisis is fundamentally
unworkable, so the only option is to buy a new gun. In the
middle case, stare decisis is seen as a “thumb on the scale” for
the cold hand of the past. Aware of this information, we might
aim slightly to the right, by lessening but not eliminating our
dependence on stare decisis. In the weaker case, the theory
offers very little. It sheds some light on reasons why our
jurisprudential gun aims to the left, but if we want a system
that is resistant to change, then we may simply decide that the
cognitive biases outlined above do not change the systemic
calculus (and may, in fact, provide reasons why the current
system is preferable). I discuss each of these possibilities in
turn.
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1. The Strong Case
The strongest form of the argument is that the legal
system reflects cognitive shortcomings and nothing more, so we
should scrap stare decisis and look to another way to
adjudicate cases. Under the strong case, judges should not
follow precedent other than as a last resort.
In the strongest form of the argument, our cognitive
biases and heuristics make reliance on precedent unreliable.
Therefore, courts should essentially engage in “de novo review”
every time. A court would not be barred from following
precedent—such a rule would be patently absurd—but there
would be a strong presumption against doing so. On appellate
review, a court would critically examine the lower court’s
citation to precedent. The appellate court would be especially
vigilant to monitor whether the district court was following
precedent as a heuristic, for example, by evaluating the district
court’s decision as measured against the five factors outlined in
the previous part.347 Moreover, in the strongest form of the
argument, not only would the practice of stare decisis reflect
cognitive bias, but the doctrine itself could be seen as arising as
a reflection of bias—and nothing more.
2. The Middle Case
The “middle ground” of this argument considers stare
decisis (history, precedent, stability) as one set of factors
among many to consider when deciding legal rules. Under this
“middle ground,” precedent should generally be respected, but
the burden of proof is on the one who wants to maintain the
status quo.
The middle ground can be illustrated with an example:
Consider a legal dispute and a given set of facts. Assume
further that the correct answer to this legal question is X,
another reasonable answer is Y, and an unreasonable answer
is Z. Under the current system of stare decisis, if an appeals
court concludes Z, that conclusion is binding on all lower courts

347

For example, if the question of a private right of action had come up on
appeal in iBasis, the reviewing court should have been wary of the decision below
because there are strong grounds to think that the iBasis court relied on precedent—
and non-binding precedent at that—as a heuristic. As it was, the iBasis appeal was
voluntarily dismissed so the court never reached the merits. Judgment, In re iBasis,
Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 08-2055 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 2009).
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and on itself.348 Under the “middle ground” that I propose here,
a subsequent court might reason as follows: An earlier court
concluded Z. However, after reviewing the basis for that
conclusion, we conclude that it was incorrect. Therefore, we
conclude X. Under this regime, a court would have the
flexibility to depart from precedent and review the rule anew.
In other words, the subsequent court would review the earlier
case out of a concern that it would follow the prior rule as a
heuristic rather than because of the informational content
contained in the rule.
However, once the subsequent court concluded X or Y,
that rule would be binding on subsequent courts. In other
words, so long as the precedential rule was reasonable, it would
be binding; courts would only be free to revisit precedent if they
were convinced the earlier rule was incorrect.
3. The Weaker Case
The weaker case is that all my theory offers is a
“tweak.” Under the existing doctrine, for example, the Supreme
Court will not overrule its earlier precedent unless it has
become demonstrably erroneous and unworkable.349 Under the
weakest version of the theory, this Article highlights one
phenomenon that should go into the calculus when Justices are
determining whether a given precedent is demonstrably
erroneous or unworkable. At the lower court level, if judges
could think of any plausible reason for sticking with the
existing rule, then they should do it. Under the weakest
version of my argument, lower courts will almost never be
justified in deviating from the existing rule. The only possible
exception might be in, for example, a SOX section 304 case in
the District of Massachusetts or some other district that
decided the private right of action question “late in the game,”
so to speak. If, after an analysis like mine, a court was
convinced to a high degree of probability that the existing rule
was the result of a cascade, the court might be justified in
deviating from the rule. Even under this conception, though, a

348

See, e.g., United States v. Humphrey, 2002 Fed.App. 0131P (6th Cir.),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Leachman, 2002 Fed.App. 0353P (6th
Cir.) (explaining that a given Sixth Circuit panel is bound to follow precedential
authority from another panel even if current panel is inclined to disagree with prior
decision).
349
See Nelson, supra note 54, at 1-3.
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lower court would probably never be justified in refusing to
follow a higher court’s rule.
D.

An Important Qualification

Imagine that I want to know if it will rain tomorrow.350
You come to me and say, “I believe it will rain tomorrow.” I
take this piece of information and add it to the available data I
have. Eventually, I use your information when I decide
whether or not it will rain tomorrow (and presumably, your
comment makes me somewhat more likely to think it will rain
tomorrow).
But now imagine that I asked you how you know it will
rain tomorrow, and you say, “It came to me in a dream.” You
didn’t check the weather report, or look at your barometer, or
collect any sort of data. Now, my faith in the epistemic basis of
your claim is shaken, and your claim carries less weight than it
otherwise would. However—and this is key—the fact that your
information came to you in a dream does not bear at all on
whether it will actually rain tomorrow. Maybe it will, for
reasons related to your dream or not, but the sensible thing for
me to do (ex ante) is to discount your assertion.
This analogy applies to my argument. It may be that
stare decisis is desirable for a variety of reasons. However, the
social psychological evidence suggests that we believe in stare
decisis because it “came to us in a dream.” Of course I don’t
mean that literally, but just as in the weather example above,
the epistemic basis of our faith in stare decisis is called into
question. The mere presence of cognitive bias can never tell us
that our decision is wrong. Biases can only tell us that the
reasons we think our decision was right are unreliable.
This qualification relates to the way I have referred to
the psychological studies in this Article. If a coffee mug is
“worth” five dollars, then we might say that it is irrational or
otherwise “suboptimal” for a person to sell it for no less than
ten dollars. In this instance, “suboptimal” would mean that the
person made the wrong substantive decision: she should have
sold the mug for five dollars but instead held out for ten to no
avail.
I am not arguing that stare decisis is suboptimal in that
sense. For example, Casey declined to overrule Roe, in part
350

Thanks to Adrian Vermeule for this example, which I adopt from his
telling almost verbatim (to the best of my recollection).
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because of considerations of stare decisis. One might read my
argument to be that (1) stare decisis is rooted in cognitive bias;
(2) bias leads to substantively suboptimal results; and
therefore (3) Casey should have overruled Roe.
But that misreads my argument. My Article takes no
position on whether Casey should have overruled Roe or any
other substantive question. The behavioral phenomena I
outlined earlier will never prove that a decision was wrong, or
even that it was the product of bias. Indeed, some of the
psychological literature argues that heuristics are not
substantively suboptimal at all.351 My point is not that the
decisions were suboptimal in every case where precedent was
followed. My point is that the reasons for arriving at that
decision are suspect.
Another point worth noting: I am arguing for a
decreased reliance on precedent in our system, but not for
judges to be oblivious to rulings in earlier, like cases. At its
inception, the doctrine of stare decisis did most of its work in
making the law “common”—that is, in making legal rules
standard across the various English counties. Certainly,
uniformity is a desirable goal for any legal system, and (at least
to some extent) advocates defend stare decisis on similar
grounds today, arguing that it makes the law more stable,
predictable, and efficient.352
Today, the “information sharing” function of stare
decisis is significantly less important. With every published
decision, and many unpublished decisions, available on
Westlaw or Lexis within a matter of months (at most), search
costs are dramatically lower. Judges are in a position to signal
to each other in a way that they were not eight hundred or a
thousand years ago.
Moreover, judges can and should learn from each other
through this information-sharing. Even in the strongest case,
procedurally rejecting stare decisis does not mean that judges
are required to ignore other (correct) decisions. It does not even
mean that judges should go out of their way to avoid the prior
results. It merely means that stare decisis carries no normative
weight, whereas in today’s jurisprudential system it is almost
always dispositive.

351

See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US
SMART (1999).
352
See supra Part II.B.
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This leads to another point: even in the strongest case,
even if the doctrine of stare decisis is eliminated altogether,
judges will still rely on precedent. Suppose that my analysis is
correct. (After all, that would be the only reason to decrease our
reliance on precedent.) The phenomena catalogued in Part III
suggest that, even in the absence of a formal mechanism by
which judges are obliged to rely on prior decisions, they will do
so anyway. In other words, even if the doctrine of stare decisis
were to be eliminated in one fell swoop, my hypothesis implies
that judges will still be relying on prior decisions in some
manner. Thus, we would not completely lose the benefits that
stare decisis provides.
E.

Will the World Come to an End? (No.)

Stare decisis is defended on a variety of grounds.353 If the
hypothesis I advocate takes hold, and prior judicial decisions
have diminished sway—even in like cases—will the legal
system fall apart at the seams? If stare decisis “controls the
caprice of judges by requiring them to suppose that all similar
future cases will be decided according to their instant
decision,”354 a weaker role for precedent might encourage the
caprice of judges. If stare decisis is “prudential and
pragmatic,”355 a weaker role for precedent might lead to
imprudent and impractical outcomes. If stare decisis enables
efficiency, a weaker role for precedent might throw parties’
prospective planning into disarray and harm our country’s
economic prospects.
I do not dwell on these possible objections to my
argument because I find them to be a canard. First, as others
have pointed out, the increasing number of unpublished
dispositions at the court of appeals level and oral decisions at
the district court level means that a large number of cases are
taken out of the “stare decisis database,” so to speak. Second,
as Nelson has thoroughly explained, a decreased reliance on
stare decisis by no means suggests that chaos will reign. Third,
it is unlikely that a decreased reliance on stare decisis will
undermine efficiency goals, as it is unclear whether the current
system furthers those goals in the first place. Fourth, stare
353

See supra Part II.
Kenneth J. Schmier & Michael K. Schmier, Has Anyone Noticed the
Judiciary’s Abandonment of Stare Decisis?, 7 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 233, 234 (2005).
355
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
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decisis may in some cases undermine, rather than further,
judicial legitimacy.
First, courts frequently, and by some accounts
increasingly, rely on unpublished dispositions (at the appeals
level) or oral dispositions (at the trial level).356 Even though
some of these decisions may be available via online databases,
litigants are instructed not to cite them.357 Schmier and Schmier
argue that the “abandonment” of stare decisis—through the
use of unpublished dispositions—is detrimental to the
democratic process.358 Whatever the merits of their argument, it
is clear that if ninety-three percent of cases are decided without
a published opinion, and where the practice has not had a
tremendous destabilizing, delegitimizing, or efficiencyimpeding effect on the law, a decreased reliance on stare
decisis will probably not wreak havoc on the rule of law.
Second, and at a deeper level, a decreased reliance on
stare decisis does not mean that courts should decide cases
based on a whim. In his article, Stare Decisis and
Demonstrably Erroneous Precedent, Caleb Nelson argues (for a
variety of reasons unrelated to my Article) that stare decisis
should not carry the almost-dispositive weight that it does
under the current regime.359 But Nelson does not argue—and
neither do I—that judges should be entirely free to make any
decision they want in a given case. Instead, Nelson adapts the
administrative law model of Chevron360 deference.361 Under
Chevron, a reviewing court will defer to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute so long as that interpretation is
“permissible,” even if the court would have chosen a different
interpretation in the first instance.362 A reviewing court is not
bound by the agency’s interpretation if it is “impermissible.”363
Nelson proposes that a similar framework apply to stare
decisis.364 A lower court should be permitted to disagree with
the stare decisis-given rule (to an extent that varies depending
on which version of my theory is adopted), but its discretion
would be limited, essentially by a reasonableness side
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
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See, e.g., Schmier & Schmier, supra note 354, at 233.
See id. at 233-34.
See generally id.
See generally Nelson, supra note 54.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
See Nelson, supra note 54, at 5-8.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
See id.
See Nelson, supra note 54, at 5-8.
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constraint. Under such a system, erroneous or otherwise
improper precedents would be more likely to be abandoned.
The reviewing court should then uphold the lower court unless
it is “impermissible,” i.e., if it has no reasonable basis in law or
fact—or if it relied on stare decisis as a heuristic.
Nelson argues persuasively that a weaker version of
stare decisis is likely to lead to a net benefit.365 Among other
things, the weaker version of stare decisis will lead to more
overruling of prior decisions and, presumably, the law
becoming more “correct” as a result. But this benefit is not
without cost; as courts engage in more overruling, the law
could become more uncertain and potentially unstable. Yet it is
not necessarily clear that the current system, with a stronger
form of stare decisis, is free from such uncertainty. After all,
when legal questions are clear, individuals would probably not
litigate them; the mere fact of litigation often signals that we
are in a gray area. In those cases, the law would not be
substantially more uncertain under a weaker version of stare
decisis. And when litigants do bring a question where the
correct answer is clear (or well-established, or easy to
ascertain) there is a very good chance that judges will adhere
to that correct answer, under any system of stare decisis,
strong or weak.366 As Nelson points out, even under a weaker
regime, the law is more likely to move toward correct decisions,
even if subsequent courts are as likely to be error-prone as
their predecessors.367
This kind of a system is not—if you will excuse the
pun—unprecedented. Appellate courts routinely affirm lower
court rulings with which they might, writing on a blank slate,
decide differently. For example, courts will affirm an agency’s
adjudication so long as it is supported by substantial evidence,
even if the court would have reached a different conclusion.
When there is an appeal following trial, all inferences are
drawn in favor of the jury’s verdict; the jury’s verdict is
affirmed so long as there is any evidence that supports it.
Issues not properly preserved for appeal are routinely reviewed
for “plain error,” meaning that a court’s conclusion is upheld
unless there is no reasonable basis for the lower court’s ruling.
In short, there are already a wide range of cases where an
365
366
367

See id. at 54-78.
See id. at 54-60.
See id. at 59-60.
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appeals court will uphold a decision it might disagree with, so
long as it has some basis in law or fact.
Now imagine that a case presents certain facts. One
judge might reach one conclusion, X, that is reasonable under
the circumstances. Some time later, on similar facts, another
judge might conclude Y. If the standard of review is plain error,
an appeals court—the same appeals court—could very well
permit both decisions to stand under the status quo. This is not
much different from the result that would obtain under a
system with a weaker reliance on precedent.
Third, it is highly unlikely that a system with decreased
reliance on stare decisis will undermine efficiency goals
(bracketing the question of whether economic efficiency should
be the goal of a system of justice at all). For example, Stake
wrote in a recent article that the demise of the fee tail estate
demonstrates the efficiency of the common law: the fee tail, by
holding that only first-born sons could inherit property, was
inefficient; the common law ultimately abolished the fee tail,
suggesting that the common law moves toward efficiency.368
However, as Hirsch points out in a persuasive reply, the
common law is not a natural system that arose of its own
accord; “it is also, through and through, a participatory system.
Human participation cannot but leave its indelible stamp.”369
That stamp, he argues, includes phenomena such as the
stickiness of legal rules, status quo bias, and the availability
heuristic.370 In other words, these psychological phenomena
undercut the common-law-as-efficiency hypothesis, even in a
very limited context (fee tails and other perpetuities).
Along these lines, no less a titan in the law and
economics field than Judge Richard Posner (and co-authors)
looked at the Economic Loss Rule in tort law, the doctrine
which holds one cannot sue for economic loss without physical
injury under certain circumstances. The doctrine arose around
the 1960s and 70s, and its application gained ground in various
states over time.371 Yet after conducting a detailed empirical
368
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Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons
for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425, 427 (2005).
370
Id. at 430-31.
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analysis, Posner and his co-authors conclude that the law did
not converge on any given point, evolved inconsistently, and,
under almost any interpretation, did not converge on
efficiency.372 Of course, this does not mean that no legal rules
ever converge on efficiency. It does, however, mean that any
critique of my argument that suggests that my proposal will
throw into whack an already-efficient system is, at best,
incomplete, and at worst, flat wrong.
Fourth, although stare decisis is thought to further the
legitimacy of the judicial system (by controlling the caprice of
individual judges), it may in some cases have the opposite
effect. As noted above,373 it is not uncommon for district courts
to adhere to a rule while telling the parties that they disagree
with that rule. In a typical court case, one party is on the losing
side. The losing party may come to view the court as less
legitimate for sticking to a rule that it acknowledges is
incorrect or otherwise inapplicable.
Finally, it is worth noting that a critique against my
Article’s premise contains the seeds of its own response. To put
it another way: I assume at the outset of this Article that stare
decisis has a constraining effect on judges and that effect
pushes decisions toward the past. Reasoning from that
premise, and on the basis of psychological evidence, I conclude
that stare decisis should have a diminished role in our
jurisprudential system.
However, some people argue that stare decisis already
does very little work to constrain judges because (1) judges are
simply enacting their own political preferences, (2) there is so
much prior case law, encompassing so many sets of facts, that
“precedent” can be used to justify virtually any position, or (3)
both.374 I find this argument to be unpersuasive. The
doctrine was first articulated in 1965); id. at 5 (explaining that the doctrine was applied
to construction cases in the 1970s).
372
See id. at 6.
373
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374
See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR
MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 287 (1999)
(concluding that precedent did not constrain Supreme Court Justices); Giacomo A. M.
Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary
Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 389 (2008) (citing a variety of scholars and
concluding that “precedents are malleable and can be interpreted with ample leeway”).
This view is not without its detractors. See, e.g., Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm
of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 1032 (1996) (concluding that stare decisis
constrains judges’ policy preferences); Emery G. Lee III, Horizontal Stare Decisis on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 92 KY. L.J. 767, 791 (2004) (concluding that
horizontal stare decisis constrains judges’ decisions in the overwhelming majority of

2009]

STARE DECISIS IS COGNITIVE ERROR

139

overwhelming majority of cases are simply not politically
charged, so that political preferences do not even enter the
equation. Indeed, even at the Supreme Court, unanimity is not
uncommon: of the seventy-five full opinions published in the
2007 term of the Supreme Court, nearly one-third of them had
no dissenting opinion.375
If judges are already unconstrained by precedent, then
the parade of horribles that will supposedly ensue should
already be happening. The legal realists’ theories acknowledge,
implicitly or explicitly, that the fact that legal decisions reflect
political preferences does not, ipso facto, throw the law into flux
because most decisions are not political. Similarly, I
acknowledge explicitly that the fact that we should decrease
reliance on stare decisis will not, ipso facto, throw the law into
flux. Moreover, if anything, an obligation to follow precedent
creates a tremendous first-mover advantage for the first court
to address a given question. For example, it might be the case
that the district judge in Neer came out against the
shareholder plaintiffs because he harbored some animus
against shareholders (or whatever). Because other courts have
followed Neer almost blindly, that initial judge’s policy
preferences have been enacted across the country. Stare decisis
may not limit the role of policy preferences; it may simply
change whose policy preferences get furthered—the first
judge’s.
There is one final point I want to make. In his 1999
article, Talley concludes that precedent cannot be explained as
an information cascade.376 First, he writes that cascades are
unlikely to occur because of the possibility of appellate
review.377 However, as Guthrie and George point out, the
overwhelming majority of cases are affirmed on appeal,
suggesting that appellate review is not as robust as Talley

cases). In a recent article, Frederick Schauer concludes that recent criticism of the
Roberts Court for not taking stare decisis seriously is overblown. Frederick Schauer,
Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381,
400-01 (2007).
375
See, e.g., The Supreme Court—The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 521
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that Justices dissent relatively rarely). In 2007-2008, only twelve cases were decided by
a five-to-four vote. Id. at 522.
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Id. at 112-13.

140

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1

assumes.378 Second, he argues that cascades are unlikely
because we know not only what courts did but also why they
did it, by way of their written opinions.379 However, as the
Sarbanes-Oxley example demonstrates, courts often dispose of
a case with little or no written explanation, suggesting that the
mere fact of a written opinion is not dispositive in determining
if a cascade is at work. Third, Talley suggests that cascades are
unlikely because judges are heterogeneous and have competing
considerations.380 However, in this line of argument, Talley
underestimates the strong institutional ethos (not to mention
the cognitive and behavioral factors) that weigh strongly in
favor of following precedent.
But Talley is right in this regard—it is difficult to
identify a cascade and it is difficult to identify cognitive bias at
work. However, I have tried to identify some factors that could
help in making that determination. In conjunction, these
factors give us at least more persuasive—even if not
conclusive—evidence. For example, in the context of the
unconscionability doctrine, Talley says that it is hard to
identify a cascade.381 However, he focuses on only one factor
(following the decision of a non-binding court).382 I have
identified other factors. These are not infallible or exhaustive.
They do, however, move us closer to knowing when bias is at
work.
It is true that appellate review might halt or reverse a
district court cascade. But if the Supreme Court hears very few
cases (it does), and if the courts of appeal affirm the
overwhelming majority of cases (they do), then a district court
cascade such as the one I identified earlier bodes poorly for
defenders of stare decisis.
V.

CONCLUSION: A WAY OUT

For a very long time—varying a bit by whom you ask—
the practice of stare decisis has been the cornerstone of AngloAmerican jurisprudence. We are taught that present-day courts
should follow the lead of their predecessors because (1) the
378
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earlier courts are more likely to have reached the correct
answer; (2) sticking with the status quo rule fosters stability,
predictability, and efficiency; and (3) the practice furthers
judicial legitimacy.
Yet as scores of studies from a variety of disciplines
show, we are not rational actors coldly picking the best solution
to a given legal problem. We take mental shortcuts and deviate
from rationality in ways we aren’t even aware. We are primed
to prefer existing social and political systems, and we place an
undue weight on tradition and the status quo. If we see others
making a given decision, we tend to follow that decision,
believing that others know best even when our “private stock of
reason” tells us otherwise. In short, our decisions are biased
and the biases are correlated.
If our biases were random, we might take some comfort
knowing that they might all cancel out. But they are not
random. We are cognitively primed to subconsciously prefer
precedent—and then, instead of correcting that bias, we built a
legal system that requires courts to follow precedent. We would
do well to look at this practice with a critical eye.
Hanson and Yosifon write that, in developing legal
theory, we ought to begin with descriptions of real human
actors and work from there.383 Similarly, the law would be more
honest, more accurate—and, yes, more just—if we cast that
same critical eye on judicial decision-making.
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